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The New Right in Water 
Rhett B. Larson* 
Abstract 
This Article divides all rights into two broad categories—
provision rights and participation rights. With a provision right, 
the government makes substantive guarantees to provide some 
minimum quantity and quality of a good or service. With a 
participation right, the government is legally proscribed from 
interfering with an individual citizen’s access to institutions and 
resources controlled or held in trust by the state, and the state is 
required to facilitate access to those institutions and resources 
equally and transparently. A growing number of national 
constitutions guarantee a right to water. Without exception to 
date, these constitutions frame the right to water as a provision 
right. A provision right to water raises serious problems of 
enforceability, equity, and sustainability. This Article critically 
evaluates the provision right to water and suggests an alternative 
participation right in water. The foundation of such a 
participation right in water is laid in many nations by the public 
trust doctrine, wherein the state holds title to water resources for 
the benefit of its citizens. Unlike the typical formulation and 
implementation of the provision right to water, a participation 
right is sustainable, equitable, and enforceable, and would 
facilitate public participation, accountability, and 
experimentation in water policy. 
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I. Introduction 
Currently, 2.3 billion people live without access to 
adequate water supplies and approximately 6,000 children 
under the age of five die every day from water-related 
diseases.1 Two-thirds of the world’s population, or 5.5 billion 
                                                                                                     
 1. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Human Right to Water, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
L. REV. 537, 538 (2006). “Water stress” occurs where inadequate water quantity 
or quality prevents water supply from meeting demand during a period of time. 
See U.N. Dep’t Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Water Scarcity, http://www.un.org/ 
waterforlifedecade/scarcity.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (discussing the 
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people, are predicted to live in areas of “water stress” by 2025 
due to climate change, population growth, and economic 
development leading to increased consumption.2 As nations 
face increasing water stress, droughts, famines, and epidemics 
could lead to greater conflict over scarce and disputed water 
resources.3 Water stress represents the preeminent global 
challenge of the coming decades.4 Those who are socially or 
economically disenfranchised suffer disproportionately from 
water stress.5  
In response to the growing crisis of water stress in many 
parts of the world, there is growing advocacy for a human 
rights-based approach to water law and policy at both the 
national and international levels.6 For example, the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution 
recognizing an international human right to water in 2010.7 
                                                                                                     
global impact of water stress and water scarcity) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 2. Amy Liu, Desalination Is No Panacea, but Holds Potential as Water 
Shortage Solution, J. YOUNG INVESTIGATORS (Sept. 2008), http://www.jyi. 
org/issue/desalination-is-no-panacea-but-holds-potential-as-water-shortage-solution/ 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Meredith Giordano, Mark Giordano & Aaron Wolf, The Geography 
of Water Conflict and Cooperation: Internal Pressures and International 
Manifestations, 168 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 293, 294 (2002) (proposing an empirical 
model to analyze the impact of water on international conflicts). 
 4. See Patricia Wouters et al., Water Security, Hydrosolidarity, and 
International Law: A River Runs Through It . . . , 19 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 97, 98 
(2008) (discussing Sir John Beddington, the United Kingdom Government Chief 
Scientist, who refers to water stress caused by economic development, 
population growth, and climate change as the “perfect storm” for a global energy 
and food crisis); Christine McGourty, Global Crisis ‘to Strike by 2030’, BBC 
NEWS (Mar. 19, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7951838.stm (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2013) (describing the dangerous combination of environmental 
change and increased demand for vital resources) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 5. See Enrique R. Carrasco & Alison K. Guernsey, The World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration, 41 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 577, 586 (2008) (discussing the World Bank Inspection 
Panel’s position that water woes in South Africa are part of the odious legacy of 
apartheid). 
 6. See G.A. Res. 64/292 ¶¶ 5, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/292 [hereinafter 
2010 U.N. Resolution] (acknowledging that access to drinking water is an 
integral component of expanding human rights). 
 7. Id.  
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The 2010 U.N. Resolution declared that the “right to safe and 
clean drinking water . . . [is] a human right that is essential for 
the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.”8 To date, forty-
one countries recognize a right to water similar to that of the 
2010 UN Resolution in their respective constitutions, including 
South Africa, Uganda, and Argentina.9 
Nevertheless, forty-one counties abstained from signing 
the 2010 UN Resolution when it was first introduced, and the 
vast majority of nations do not have a constitutionally 
protected right to water.10 Reluctance to embrace a rights-
based approach to water policy arguably stems from the 
uncertain effect of such an approach. Formulations of the right 
to water often leave unanswered the most fundamental and 
important questions of water policy, including questions of who 
owns water, how to price water, whether to subsidize water 
services, and whether such a right is sustainable and 
enforceable. The challenge of a rights-based approach to water 
policy is how to frame such a right so as to effectively answer 
these fundamental questions. 
Rights are typically framed in one of two ways.11 On 
the one hand, rights could be characterized as negative 
                                                                                                     
 8. Id. ¶ 1. 
 9. See Barton H. Thompson, Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. 
REV. 17, 32–33 (2011) (describing a small but growing trend towards recognizing 
a constitutional right to water). 
 10. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts 
Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human Right, by 
Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None Against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press 
Release GA/10967 (July 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga 
10967.doc.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (abstaining countries at the time of 
introduction include Australia, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, 
Israel, Kenya, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) (on 
file with Washington and Lee Law Review). The United States expressed 
concerns that the Resolution could frustrate efforts to develop a more durable 
human right to water on other fronts. See Memorandum from John F. Sammis, 
U.S. Deputy Representative to the Econ. & Soc. Council, Explanation of Vote by 
John F. Sammis, U.S. Deputy Representative to the Economic and Social 
Council, on Resolution A/64/L.63/Rev.1, the Human Right to Water (July 28, 
2010), http://www.usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/145279.htm (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2013) (explaining to the President the decision to abstain from 
voting) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 
118, 121–22 (1969) (discussing the basic distinction between positive and 
negative rights); Frank B. Cross, The Error in Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
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rights.12 These rights include freedom of speech, freedom from 
religious, racial, or ethnic discrimination, and freedom from 
arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty and property by the 
government.13 Such rights are guarantees against government 
action, unless the government provides citizens due process and 
demonstrates a sufficient compelling countervailing government 
interest.14 The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution and the rights enumerated in U.N. Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (the CP Covenant) are examples of 
negative rights.15  
On the other hand, rights could be characterized as positive 
rights.16 Positive rights include rights to education, to health 
care, or to housing.17 These positive rights create affirmative 
duties, requiring governments to take action to ensure them.18 
The rights enumerated in the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (the ESC Covenant) are examples of positive 
rights, which include adequate wages, food, clothing, housing, 
                                                                                                     
857, 863 (2001) (arguing that Berlin’s original distinction between positive and 
negative rights has changed over time, especially in regards to positive rights to 
government support). 
 12. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.   
 13. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 269 (1979) (“If 
someone has a right to something, then it is wrong for the government to deny it 
to him even though it would be in the general interest to do so.”). 
 14. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985) (stating that legal classifications based on race are valid under the 
Fourteenth Amendment only if they are tailored to serve a “compelling state 
interest”). 
 15. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 52, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI), 
at 52–58 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter CP Covenant] (recognizing numerous areas 
in which people are free from government interference). 
 16. See Berlin, supra note 11, at 122 (stating that positive rights grant a 
person or entity the authority to order another into action).  
 17. See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the 
Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory 
Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 789–90 
(2012) (discussing the South African Constitution, which provides positive 
rights to sufficient food and water). See generally Kenneth Roth, Defending 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (2004). 
 18. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 (describing positive rights as the right 
to “command government action”).  
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health care, and education.19 The distinction between positive 
and negative rights, while in some ways intuitive, is problematic 
because even negative rights impose an affirmative obligation on 
the state to provide some adjudicative and enforcement 
mechanisms.20 
Instead of this more common distinction between negative 
and positive rights, this Article distinguishes between “provision 
rights” and “participation rights.”21 Under provision rights, the 
government guarantees provision of a certain quantity and 
quality of goods or services.22 Provision rights roughly correspond 
to positive rights. Under a participation right, the government is 
proscribed from interfering with institutions or resources 
controlled or held in trust by the state without meeting threshold 
levels of transparency, due process, and public participation. 
Even in those instances, the state must demonstrate a 
countervailing public interest.23 Participation rights roughly 
correspond to negative rights. The provision versus participation 
distinction is preferable to the more common distinction between 
negative and positive rights because it explicitly acknowledges 
the key interests and obligations at stake with each kind of right, 
as well as the fact that, regardless of the type of right, the state 
has prescribed obligations, as opposed to merely proscribed acts, 
behaviors, or rationales.24 Another way of understanding the 
                                                                                                     
 19. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2200(XXI), at 49–52 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ESC Covenant] 
(recognizing numerous positive rights to basic human necessities). 
 20. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 11, at 864–65 (discussing the argument that 
all rights are positive rights because even negative rights depend on 
government action). 
 21. See generally Justin Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather 
than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012). 
 22. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 
VA. L. REV. 723, 725 (2011) (stating that courts in the United States offer a 
certain quantity of procedural justice).  
 23. See, e.g., Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with Application to 
Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 871, 874 (2011) 
(arguing that despite committing no crime, prisoners of war can be detained 
legally and morally because the risks of war outweigh the moral principles 
underlying the criminal justice system). 
 24. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864–65 (discussing the theoretical 
difficulties with a positive and negative rights dichotomy).  
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difference between these types of rights is that provision rights 
are rights to some good or service (healthcare, education, food, 
water), whereas participation rights are rights in some 
institution or resource held in trust by the state for the benefit of 
its citizens (courts, regulatory bodies, elections, state-controlled 
infrastructure, or natural resources). 
National constitutions, legal scholars, and advocates of the 
international human right to water typically frame the right to 
water as a provision right.25 For example, the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission issued General Comment 15 to the ESC 
Covenant in 2002, which considers a provision right to water a 
prerequisite to the realization of other rights under the ESC 
Covenant, including the right to a standard of living and 
adequate food.26 Furthermore, where the right to water is 
recognized by domestic courts or constitutions, it has been 
exclusively framed as a provision right.27 
In one sense, the case for a provision right to water seems 
simple and compelling. People need water to survive. All other 
government actions are irrelevant without basic water provision. 
Of course, implementing a provision right to water is not simple.  
                                                                                                     
 25. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 1, at 539–40 (discussing the origins of a 
positive right to water); Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: 
Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) 
(advocating international action to recognize a human right to water); Peter H. 
Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL’Y 487, 487–503 (1999) (arguing 
that the right to water is a fundamental human right supported by 
international law); 2010 U.N. Resolution, supra note 6, ¶ 8 (recognizing the 
human right to “safe and clean drinking water and sanitation”). See generally 
Anna F. S. Russell, International Organizations and Human Rights: Realizing, 
Resisting, or Repackaging the Right to Water?, 9 J. HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2010). 
 26. See General Comment No. 15, Subcomm. on the Promotion & Prot. of 
Human Rights, 29th Sess., Nov. 29, 2002 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 
2002) [hereinafter General Comment 15] (stating that the right to water “clearly 
falls within the category of essential guarantees for securing an adequate 
standard of living”). 
 27. See UNITED NATIONS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE RIGHT TO WATER: FACT 
SHEET NO. 35, 1, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet 
35en.pdf (“Several national constitutions protect the right to water or outline 
the general responsibility of the State to ensure access to safe drinking water 
and sanitation for all.”); CONSTITUTION, art. 43 (2010) (Kenya) (providing a 
positive right to healthcare, housing, food, water, social security, and education); 
CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR 2008 [C.P.] ch. 2, § 1, 
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html#moz 
TocId64283 (declaring the human right to water essential). 
2188 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2013) 
In India, for instance, the Supreme Court inferred a 
provision right to water from the constitutional right to life under 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.28 The Court stated that 
“the right to access to clean drinking water is fundamental to life 
and there is a duty on the state under Article 21 to provide clean 
drinking water to its citizens.”29 Despite this provision right, only 
seventeen percent of the population in India has access to tapped, 
treated water, including only thirty-eight percent of urban 
residents.30 Eighty percent of the children in India suffer from 
water-borne diseases, with a total of forty-four million people 
suffering from illnesses related to poor water quality.31 The 
example of India illustrates the larger reality—adopting a 
provision right to water has not resulted in improved water 
provision.32 
Actual provision of an adequate quantity and quality of 
water thus does not necessarily follow the legal recognition of a 
provision right to water.33 A provision right to water may fail to 
achieve effective and equitable water provision for many reasons. 
First, provision rights in general raise problems of judicial 
enforcement.34 The judiciary, as the arbiter of rights, may lack 
                                                                                                     
 28. See INDIA CONST. art. 21 (providing due process protection for life and 
liberty).  
 29. A.P. Pollution Control Bd. II v. Naidu, (2000) Supp. 5 S.C.R. 249, at ¶ 3, 
http://www.ielrc.org/content/e0010.pdf. 
 30. Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to 
Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 957, 981 (2004); see also Ruchi Pant, From 
Communities’ Hands to MNCs’ BOOTs: A Case Study from India on Right to 
Water, THE RIGHTS TO WATER & SANITATION 16–17 (2003), 
http://www.righttowater.info/wp-content/uploads/From-Communities-Hands-to-
MNCs-BOOTs.pdf (providing numerous statistics regarding water shortages 
throughout India). 
 31. Bluemel, supra note 30, at 981.   
 32. See David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights: The Poor Will Not 
Need Our Charity if We Need Their Water 5–7 (Oct. 8, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15 
49570 (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (showing through empirical analysis that 
constitutional rights to water in twelve countries had little effect on water 
availability) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 33. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 34. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1336 (2d ed. 
1988) (stating that affirmative obligations placed upon governments to provide 
basic sustenance to its citizens would be subject to difficulties with judicial 
enforcement). 
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the relative institutional competency as compared to other 
governmental entities, to effectively establish minimum 
quantities and qualities and maximum and minimum prices of 
goods and services.35 In short, a provision right to water 
implicates the “familiar difficulties with judicial enforcement of 
affirmative duties.”36  
Second, water is unique among other candidates for the 
status of provision right. The investments required for water and 
sanitation infrastructure are uniquely high, even as compared to 
the capital requirements other candidates for provision right 
status, like education or healthcare.37 Because water 
infrastructure is uniquely capital intensive, the countries most in 
need of a provision right to water are also those typically least 
able to afford it.38 Furthermore, political pressure on government 
rate-makers and government corruption in granting concession 
contracts to water utility companies have negative impacts 
attracting investment and lending in water infrastructure 
financing, cost recovery for water services, and water pricing.39 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 618–23 (1923) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court does not have the institutional 
capabilities to determine the proper allocation of natural gas between 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia). 
 36. TRIBE, supra note 34, at 1336. 
 37. See, e.g., JAMES WINPENNY, WORLD PANEL ON FINANCING WATER 
INFRASTRUCTURE, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 6 (2003) [hereinafter CAMDESSUS 
REPORT] (stating that because only ten percent of water infrastructure is 
financed privately, public funding is important in developing water 
infrastructure); John Briscoe, The Financing of Hydropower, Irrigation and 
Water Supply Infrastructure in Developing Countries, 15 INT’L J. WATER 
RESOURCES DEV. 459, 460 (1999) (estimating that developing nations spend $65 
billion annually on water-related infrastructure); Camille Pannu, Drinking 
Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from California’s Central Valley, 100 CAL. L. 
REV. 223, 268 (2012) (noting the high cost of upgrading water infrastructure). 
 38. See generally John Briscoe, The Changing Face of Water Infrastructure 
Financing in Developing Countries, 15 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 301 
(1999). 
 39. See David Hall & Emanuele Lobina, Pipe Dreams: The Failure of the 
Private Sector to Invest in Water Services in Developing Countries, PUB. SERVS. 
INT’L RESEARCH UNIT 43–44 (Mar. 2006), http://gala.gre.ac.uk/3601/1/ 
PSIRU_9618_-_2006-03-W-investment.pdf (discussing a case of political 
corruption in awarding a water infrastructure contract to a Turkish company). 
See generally Emmanuel Jimenez, Human and Physical Infrastructure: Public 
Investment and Pricing Policies in Developing Countries, in 3 HANDBOOK DEV. 
ECON. 2773 (1995). 
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Additionally, because water is a common-pool resource that falls 
for free out of the sky and often carries significant cultural and 
religious meaning, people are generally more reluctant to pay full 
price for its provision than for other goods or services.40 These 
factors combine to make water services underpriced in most of 
the world, leading to serious sustainability problems.41 
Underpriced water results in greater water consumption and 
water waste, with associated ecological and human health 
impacts, and decreases cost recovery on water provision, thus 
decreasing investment in improving, expanding, and developing 
water treatment and distribution infrastructure.42 Policies 
leading to underpriced water, including a provision right to 
water, are bad for the environment, bad for the economy, and bad 
for the poor. 
This Article evaluates the provision right to water, including 
the challenges of enforceability associated with provision rights 
in general and the unique implications for economic and ecologic 
sustainability associated with a provision right to water more 
specifically. This Article then proposes an alternative approach 
based on participation rights that avoids the questions of 
enforceability and sustainability, while enhancing transparency 
and stakeholder involvement in the development of water policy. 
Essentially, I argue against a right to water, but in favor of a 
right in water. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses the 
rationale behind a rights-based approach to water policy, 
distinguishes provision rights from participation rights, and 
describes the current predominant formulation of a provision 
right to water.43 The rationale behind a right to water is that 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1883 (2005) (arguing that the low price of water leads to 
inefficient water use).  
 41. See generally JAMES WINPENNY, MANAGING WATER AS AN ECONOMIC 
RESOURCE (1994). 
 42. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 10 (discussing water sector 
risks); Charles Sampford, Water Rights and Water Governance: A Cautionary 
Tale and the Case for Interdisciplinary Governance, in WATER ETHICS 45, 47 
(Marcelino Botin ed., 2007) (stating that because Australian farmers receive 
water for free, they use water inefficiently). 
 43. See General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 16 (delineating a positive 
right to water).  
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such an approach emphasizes the primacy of water and also 
empowers the economically or socially disadvantaged who suffer 
most from water stress.44 Part III provides a critique of the 
current provision-rights paradigm to the right to water, using a 
case study from South Africa to illustrate why this approach is 
often ecologically and economically unsustainable and practically 
unenforceable.45 In summary, the provision right to water is 
unenforceable because courts lack the institutional competency to 
evaluate the adequacy of water quality, quantity, and pricing.46 
The provision to water is unsustainable because it leads to 
underpriced water, and cheap water leads to increased water 
consumption and less cost recovery to maintain and upgrade 
water infrastructure.47 
Using an example from a recent case in Botswana, Part IV 
proposes and evaluates an alternative approach based on a 
participation right in water.48 A participation rights approach 
avoids the problems of sustainability associated with provision 
rights while ensuring procedural safeguards in water policy and 
empowering disadvantaged communities with an enforceable 
right.49 Empowering disadvantaged communities and 
establishing procedural safeguards will facilitate fair and broad 
stakeholder participation in water-policy development, and 
mitigate the effect of government corruption on sustainable and 
equitable water policy.50 While a participation right could be 
expressly incorporated into a national constitution, existing civil 
and political rights jurisprudence and legal doctrines may allow 
for the organic development of a participation right in water. In 
                                                                                                     
 44. Infra Part II. 
 45. Infra Part III.  
 46. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 618–23 (1923) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court does not have the institutional 
capabilities to determine the proper allocation of natural gas between 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia). 
 47. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 10 (describing specific risks 
associated with water that lead to overutilization and underproduction). 
 48. Infra Part IV.  
 49. See Hubert H.G. Savenije & Pieter van der Zaag, Water as an Economic 
Good and Demand Management: Paradigms with Pitfalls, 27 WATER INT’L 98, 
100 (2002) (arguing that free water favors the rich at the expense of the poor). 
 50. See Hall & Lobina, supra note 39, at 44 (discussing a case of political 
corruption in awarding a water infrastructure contract to a Turkish company). 
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particular, I argue that the public trust doctrine provides a 
foundation for a participation right in water. The public trust 
doctrine as applied to water means that title to all water is held 
by the state for the benefit of all citizens.51 As a doctrine 
grounded in Roman and British law and increasingly recognized 
under international law, the public trust doctrine provides a 
broadly accepted foundation upon which to build a participation 
right in water.52 Indeed, something akin to participation rights in 
other public trust resources has already been recognized and 
enforced in many instances.53 
This Article argues that the interest citizens, as beneficiaries 
of the public trust, hold in water is akin to a property right, with 
the state owing a fiduciary duty to its citizens under the public 
trust doctrine to facilitate stakeholder participation in water 
policy development and establish procedural protections for water 
management decisions, like rate increases or disconnection. 
Where a state unreasonably interferes with that quasi-property 
                                                                                                     
 51. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475–77 (1970) (discussing 
the historical development of the public trust doctrine). 
 52. See Ved P. Nanda & William K. Ris, The Public Trust Doctrine: A 
Viable Approach to International Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
291, 297–98 (1976) (discussing the Roman and English law origins of the public 
trust doctrine); Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 741; Mark Dowie, In Law 
We Trust, ORION MAG., July 2005, http://www.orionmagazine.org/index.php/ 
articles/article/122 (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (discussing the historical evolution 
of the public trust doctrine) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. See, e.g., Nat’l Audobon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 731 (Cal. 
1983) (allowing the state to revoke prior use permit without implicating eminent 
domain because of public trust doctrine); R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 
N.W.2d 781, 791 (Wis. 2001) (denying permit to riparian to finish construction of 
marina based on habitat protection was not a regulatory taking requiring 
compensation because of public trust doctrine); Labroador Inuit Ass’n v. 
Newfoundland, [1997] 155 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 93, 113 (Can.) (overturning the 
government’s decision to exempt a mining project from environmental 
assessment under the public trust doctrine); M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) 
1 S.C.C. 388, 415 (India) (ruling that a lease of public land approving blasting 
within a national park violated the public trust doctrine); Waweru v. Republic, 
(1996) 1 K.L.R. 677 (Kenya) (holding that government refusal to prosecute a 
boat discharging raw sewage into the Kiserian River constituted a violation of 
the public trust doctrine); Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792, 
797–98 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.) (holding that logging licenses on public land 
violated the constitutionally established public trust doctrine). These cases are 
hereinafter referred to as “Examples of Public Trust Doctrine Application 
Internationally.”  
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right or violates that fiduciary duty under the public trust 
doctrine without due process, transparency, and a compelling 
countervailing state interest, the state infringes its citizens’ 
participation right in water. If framed properly, a participation 
right in water based on the public trust doctrine would promote 
transparency, accountability, and experimentation in the 
development of water policy. 
II. The Purpose and Formulation of the Right to Water  
Isaiah Berlin wrote: “First things come first: there are 
situations, as a nineteenth-century Russian radical writer 
declared, in which boots are superior to the works of 
Shakespeare; individual freedom is not everyone’s primary 
need.”54 As Berlin recognized, provision of primary needs, like 
water, is a foundation upon which to build a society capable of 
protecting individual freedom.55 Applying the rights framework to 
the provision of primary needs both elevates their legal priority 
and provides legal recourse for the least advantaged to secure 
their access to these essential resources.56  
Water is a peculiar “primary need” because it is the only 
primary need a government is capable of providing for which 
there is no substitute.57 There are different kinds of food, energy, 
shelter, education, employment, and health care. But only water 
is water. There is no person, industry, or nation that does not 
depend on it, and it is embedded in every product and service.58 
                                                                                                     
 54. Berlin, supra note 11, at 124.  
 55. See id. (arguing that peasants in ancient Egypt needed the basic 
necessities of life more than they needed individual liberty). 
 56. See Tara J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New 
Governance, New Accountability, and a 21st Century War on the Sources of 
Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2010) (arguing that the federal 
government should retake control of social welfare law). See generally JULIA 
HÄEUSERMANN, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT (1998). 
 57. See Aaron T. Wolf, Criteria for Equitable Allocations: The Heart of 
International Water Conflict, 23 NAT. RESOURCES FORUM 3, 3 (1999), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477-8947.1999.tb00235.x/pdf (“Water 
is the only scarce resource for which there is no substitute . . . .”). 
 58. Supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Thompson, supra note 9, 
at 18–19 (“Water is unique among all resources. Water is essential not only to 
life, but to virtually any human endeavor and thus the betterment of society.”). 
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Moreover, unlike other primary needs, water moves—it moves 
through the air, through rivers, and through the ground without 
regard to political borders, and moves through international 
commerce.59 Water transports energy, nutrients, minerals, 
diseases, and toxins around the world. It is essential to all life on 
earth and is a significant cause of death on the planet.60 The 
unique nature of water makes it a prime candidate for the status 
of a “right,” but that unique nature also makes framing the right 
to water uniquely challenging.61 
This section discusses the rationale behind a rights-based 
approach to water policy, distinguishes participation rights from 
provision rights, and describes the predominant provision rights 
formulation of the right to water.  
A. The Rationale Behind a Rights-Based Approach to Water 
Policy 
Some scholars have argued against a rights-based approach 
to human welfare issues.62 The debate about the efficacy of a 
                                                                                                     
 59. See J.A. (Tony) Allan, Virtual Water - the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus 
Useful Concept or Misleading Metaphor, 28 WATER INT’L 4, 4–5 (2003) 
(explaining that countries trading in water-intensive agricultural goods are also 
trading in the use of water); J.A. Allan, Virtual Water—Part of an Invisible 
Synergy that Ameliorates Water Scarcity, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? 
131, 134 (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that the “dominant use of 
water” is food production).  
 60. See PETER H. GLEICK, DIRTY WATER: ESTIMATED DEATHS FROM WATER-
RELATED DISEASES 2000–2020, at 9 (2002), http://www.pacinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/water_related_deaths_report3.pdf (predicting that “as 
many as 76 million people will die by 2020 of preventable water-related 
diseases”). 
 61. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 33 (“[T]he view that water is a human 
right remains highly contested. . . . [A]pproximately 20% of all the countries who 
are members of the United Nations voted to abstain from the recent declaration 
of water as a human right.”). 
 62. See Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1758, 1758 (2008) (introducing the idea that “international concern should 
be focused on human welfare rather than on human rights”); Laurence R. 
Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1857–58 (2002) (illustrating the “unsettling possibility 
that the optimal level of compliance with a human rights treaty for a particular 
state might be less than perfect compliance”). 
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rights-based approach to human welfare in general is outside the 
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, this subsection provides a 
brief discussion of the rationales typically given in support of a 
rights-based approach toward human welfare issues, like water 
policy. This discussion is necessary to evaluate the aims and 
efficacy of a right to water, whether a provision right or a 
participation right.63 Most arguments in favor of a right to water 
rely on one of three rationales—that the right to water fosters 
appropriate policy priorities, facilitates equality, and advances 
government accountability.64 
The Bolivian Water War of 2000 provides useful context to 
illustrate these different rationales. The City of Cochabamba in 
Bolivia had been suffering from severe water supply, quality, and 
infrastructure problems.65 Only half the population was 
connected to the city’s water system, while others were forced to 
find alternative means to supply themselves with water.66 To 
secure necessary funding for improvements, Cochabamba 
privatized the city’s water supply and infrastructure.67 The 
                                                                                                     
 63. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 (describing positive and negative 
rights).  
 64. See VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND 
PROFIT 15, 27–28, 34–36 (2002) (arguing that the privatization of water 
resources “destroy[s] the earth and aggravate[s] inequality” and therefore water 
should be recognized as a human right); David R. Boyd, No Taps, No Toilets: 
First Nations and the Constitutional Right to Water in Canada, 57 MCGILL L.J. 
81, 122–23  (2011) (arguing that recognizing a right to water will “provide a 
means of holding governments accountable”); Simon Caney, Climate Change, 
Human Rights and Moral Thresholds, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
69, 73 (Stephen Humphreys ed., 2010) (arguing that classifying water as a 
human right may give the term “lexical priority” and thus encourage better 
policy). 
 65. See OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS, ¡COCHABAMBA! WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA 
7–8 (2004) (explaining the city’s historical problems with water and water 
supply).  
 66. See id. at 8–9 (explaining the way Cochabamba’s residents received 
water at the time the government privatized the water utility); Simon Marvin & 
Nina Laurie, An Emerging Logic of Urban Water Management, Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, 36 URB. STUDS. 341, 343 (1999) (detailing the water problems facing low 
income communities in Latin America).  
 67. See Private Passions, ECONOMIST (July 17, 2003), http://www. 
economist.com/node/1906828 (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) (discussing the water 
infrastructure projects the Bolivian government desired to accomplish through 
privatizing the utility) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Kristin Komives, Designing Pro-Poor Water and Sewer Concessions: Early 
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concession contract to the private water utility required increases 
in water tariffs and prohibition of alternative methods of water 
provision other than connection to the city system.68 
The public response to Cochabamba’s prohibition on 
alternative water sourcing and increased water rates quickly 
escalated into large-scale protests of the concession contract by 
early 2000.69 After a prolonged and violent standoff, the 
protestors and the government reached an accord, nullifying the 
concession contract, repealing prohibitions on alternative water 
provision, and turning over ownership and operation of the city’s 
water services to the municipal government.70 Water quality and 
                                                                                                     
Lessons from Bolivia 1 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 2243, 1999) (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=629179 (explaining that governments of developing countries often 
turn to privatization in order to fund water infrastructure improvements) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 68. See Andrew Nickson & Claudia Vargas, The Limitations of Water 
Regulation: The Failure of the Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL. 
LATIN AM. RES. 99, 107 (2002) (detailing the nature and effects of the Bolivian 
concession contract for water provision). Cochabamba issued a concession 
contract to the sole bidder on its water project, a consortium led by U.S. 
construction company Bechtel, called Aguas del Tunari (ADT). Id. at 106. ADT 
signed a forty-year concession contract with the city, with a guaranteed 16% 
annual return on investment. Id. at 100, 111. The exigencies of meeting ADT’s 
contractual rights resulted in an increase in water rates of 35%. Id. at 107, 111. 
The fee structure set up by the concession contract, along with an increase in 
supply due to leak prevention, led to some water bills rising as much as 200%. 
Id. at 111–12.  
 69. See OLIVERA & LEWIS, supra note 65, at 33–49 (detailing the standoff 
and conflict that eventually lead to water management in Cochabamba being 
entrusted to the municipal government). 
 70. Id. Cochabamba claimed that ADT had abandoned the city and thus 
voided the contract as the grounds for nullifying the concession contract. See 
Timothy O’Neill, Note, Water and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and its 
Implications for Democracy and Human Rights in the Developing World, 17 
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 357, 370–71 (2005–2006) (describing the events 
leading up to the rescission of the water contract between the Bolivian 
government and ADT). ADT brought a claim against the government of Bolivia 
in the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
claiming breach of the concession contract and violation of international law. 
See Amanda L. Norris & Katina E. Metzidakis, Public Protests, Private 
Contracts: Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration and the Cochabamba Water 
War, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 30, 42 (2010) (providing an account of ADT’s 
actions after water services in Cochabamba were turned back over to the 
municipal government). 
THE NEW RIGHT IN WATER 2197 
water services remain problematic in Cochabamba, with more 
than half of the city’s population unconnected to services.71 
The Cochabamba water conflict illustrates the three main 
rationales for a rights-based water policy. The first rationale is 
that a right to water serves as a bulwark against inequity.72 
Advocates fear that water policy driven by profit will make water 
less affordable for the poor.73 Empirical studies indicate that 
privatization typically does lead to increased water rates.74 There 
are several reasons for this, including the political pressure on 
public systems to maintain low rates and the necessity of private 
water utilities to see a return on large up-front investments in 
infrastructure expansion and refurbishment (with increased rates 
often guaranteed in government contracts).75 This raises the 
concern that private water companies will neglect poorer 
communities because of the greater likelihood of cost recovery for 
improvements and services in wealthier areas.76 A rights-based 
approach is thus partially a response to the perceived economic 
inequalities arising from privatization, whereby water is 
guaranteed as a right regardless of ability to pay.77 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                     
 71. See Juan Forero, Bolivia Regrets IMF Experiment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/14/business/worldbusiness/14iht-water. 
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) (“[H]alf of the 600,000 
people in Cochabamba remain without water, and those who do have service 
have it only intermittently, some as little as three hours a day.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); MICHAEL J. ROUSE, INSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF WATER SERVICES THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 
141–42 (2007) (detailing the state of Cochabamba’s water supply after the failed 
attempt at privatization). 
 72. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 38 (explaining the claim that anything 
other than a rights-based approach to water policy will result in gross 
disadvantage to the world’s poor). 
 73. See id. (“[A]dvocates fear that privatized water companies will make it 
more difficult for the poor to obtain water directly from urban systems.”). 
 74. See Jennifer Davis, Private-Sector Participation in the Water and 
Sanitation Sector, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 145, 166 (2005) (“[M]uch of 
the empirical literature on [private sector participation] in [water and sewer] 
service delivery documents increases in monthly service fees following 
privatization.”). 
 75. See id. at 165–67 (explaining the reasons behind price increases when 
water services are privatized). 
 76. See id. at 165 (explaining that providing water services to the poor 
must be prioritized when privatization takes place because there will be less 
economic incentive to serve these communities). 
 77. See Boyd, supra note 64, at 112 (“There are a number of reasons why it 
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the Cochabamba example illustrates that inequity existed before 
privatization, and persists under the current publicly owned 
water system in Cochabamba.78 In any event, a rights-based 
approach to water policy is most often justified on the grounds 
that it guarantees a minimum quantity and quality of water for 
all, regardless of ability to pay. 
The second rationale relates to the idea of putting “first 
things first,” as Berlin suggests.79 When the label “right” is 
attached to a public policy issue, the label gives that issue “lexical 
priority.”80 Water is thus often characterized as a right because it 
is essential to the realization of all other rights and a 
precondition for economic development.81 Additionally, water is 
traditionally most closely associated with environmental law.82 
Applying the “rights” label elevates water relative to other policy 
priorities by appealing to a constituency beyond 
environmentalists.83  
The “putting first things first” rationale for rights-based 
water policy is evident in the Cochabamba example on both 
sides.84 Advocates of privatization argued that it would attract 
investment in improving water quality and infrastructure, 
essential to providing a foundation for other economic 
                                                                                                     
is important to recognize that access to safe drinking water is a legally protected 
human right, rather than a commodity or a service provided on a charitable 
basis.”). 
 78. Supra note 71 and accompanying text.     
 79. Supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Caney, supra note 64, at 73 (using the term “lexical priority” to 
argue that “human rights generally take priority over moral values”); Daniel 
Bodansky, Climate Change and Human Rights: Unpacking the Issues, 38 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 511, 514 (2010) (discussing the possibility that human rights 
have “lexical priority” in the context of climate change and environmental law).  
 81. General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 1. General Comment 15 
provides that sufficient clean water is a human right because it is 
“indispensable for leading a healthy life in human dignity” and a “prerequisite 
to the realization of all other human rights.” Id.  
 82. See Bodansky, supra note 80, at 512–14 (contrasting environmental 
and human rights law as applied to the issue of climate change).  
 83. See id. at 518 (“[C]haracterizing something as a human rights problem 
elevates its standing relative to other issues. It gives the problem greater moral 
urgency and appeals to an additional constituency beyond environmentalists.”). 
 84. Supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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development and the ultimate realization of expanded rights.85 
On the other hand, protestors argued that a right to water 
guaranteed provision of adequate water as a prerequisite to any 
other development goal, and high tariffs driven by profit demands 
of investors violated that right.86  
The third rationale for recognizing a right to water is to 
facilitate government accountability and transparency.87 This 
rationale speaks to a fundamental doctrine of water law in many 
parts of the world—the public trust doctrine.88 Under the public 
trust doctrine, title to water resources is held by the state as 
trustee for the benefit of citizens, with a state obligation to 
manage water resources for the general public welfare.89 The 
public trust doctrine, though applied in different ways in 
different nations, is a recognized legal doctrine in much of the 
world, including India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Uganda, 
Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and Canada.90 A 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Jessica Budds & Gordon McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water 
Privatization Missing the Point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
15 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 87, 108 (2003) (“Most countries have been under 
substantial donor pressure to privatize, in order to access loans or debt relief. . . . In 
Tanzania, the World Bank has recommended improvements . . . in order to attract a 
private sector operator, but is not willing to grant further financial assistance until 
one is in place.”). 
 86. See Bluemel, supra note 30, at 967 (describing the protests against 
privatizing water services due to the risk poorer communities face of either higher 
prices or less service); Juan Miguel Picolotti, The Right to Water in Argentina (Nov. 
5, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (advocating for an internationally recognized 
right to water) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); THE 
COCHABAMBA DECLARATION, Dec. 8, 2000 [hereinafter COCHABAMBA DECLARATION], 
available at http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/imf/bolivia/cochabamba. 
htm#declaration (“Water is a fundamental human right and a public trust to be 
guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should not be commodified, 
privatized or traded for commercial purposes.”).  
 87. See Boyd, supra note 64, at 122–23 (arguing that recognizing a right to 
water will “provide a means of holding governments accountable”). 
 88. See Nanda & Ris, supra note 52, at 297–98 (explaining how the public trust 
doctrine could function if used for environmental protection). See generally Sax, 
supra note 51. 
 89. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 20 (explaining the public trust doctrine as 
it relates to water rights). 
 90. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 745 (“In [India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and 
Canada], the [public trust] doctrine has become equated with environmental 
protection and is frequently entrenched in constitutional and statutory 
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rights-based approach may provide citizens with a potential 
remedy against mismanagement by the trustee of public trust 
resources.91 Opponents of the Cochabamba concession relied on 
the public trust doctrine in their arguments opposing 
privatization of the Cochabamba water and infrastructure, noting 
that water is “a public trust to be guarded by all levels of 
government.”92 
These three rationales—equity, priority, and accountability—
also influence how a right to water is framed, whether as a 
provision right or as a participation right.93 It is to that 
distinction that this Article now turns. 
B. Delineating Provision Rights and Participation Rights 
The previous subpart enumerates possible answers to the 
question “Why recognize a right to water?” This subpart discusses 
two types of rights in which the right to water could be 
categorized. These two types of rights are provision rights and 
participation rights.94 
“Provision rights” are interests of individuals or communities 
that a state must satisfy, or obligations or duties owed by the 
state to individuals.95 These interests and obligations typically 
relate to fulfilling needs for certain “primary goods” essential for 
                                                                                                     
provisions.”). 
 91. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 20 (explaining that if the government 
was considered a trustee of a public trust, it would have a “responsibility to 
manage water for the interests of the public and, as a result, [would] hold[] [a] 
more restricted ownership right”). 
 92. COCHABAMBA DECLARATION, supra note 86. 
 93. For criticisms of the commodification of water resources, see MAUDE 
BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE COMING BATTLE 
FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER 58–62, 91–101 (2007), which argues that privatization 
will never be able to provide water for the poor and that it has been a mistake to 
attempt to privatize water services. See also SHIVA, supra note 64, at 15, 27–28, 
34–36 (“Market solutions destroy the earth and aggravate inequality. The 
solution to an ecological crisis is ecological, and the solution for injustice is 
democracy. Ending the water crisis requires rejuvenating ecological 
democracy.”). 
 94. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 (describing positive and negative 
rights). 
 95. See generally Hellen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: 
The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999). 
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realizing other rights and responsibilities.96 Essentially, the 
government ensures basic access to primary goods because 
certain personal freedoms are worth little to the least advantaged 
unless first guaranteed a baseline supply of primary goods 
(Berlin’s “boots before Shakespeare,” except in this case, it is 
“water before freedom of religion”).97 This baseline supply is often 
called a “minimum core” of a primary good essential to support 
life and basic human dignity.98 Governments ensure access to a 
minimum core of primary goods by means of provision rights. The 
ESC Covenant’s guarantees of access to health care, education, 
housing, and food are classical formulations of provision rights.99 
Provision rights are utilitarian and consequentialist because the 
obligation to meet a minimum core of primary goods is aimed at 
achieving certain outcomes.100 
Participation rights, on the other hand, are by nature 
deontological and independent of the state and its desired ends of 
social good.101 The essential distinction between participation 
rights and provision rights is that states guarantee provision 
rights when that provision serves the general interest, whereas 
                                                                                                     
 96. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) (“[S]uppose that the 
basic structure of society distributes certain primary goods, that is, things that 
every rational man is presumed to want. . . . For simplicity, assume that the 
chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, and income and wealth.”). 
 97. Id.; supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Sylvia F. Liu, 
American Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Federal Obligation to Protect 
Tribal Water Resources and Tribal Autonomy, 25 ENVTL L. 425, 439–40 (1995) 
(discussing the idea of water as a primary good in the context of the American 
Indian reserved water rights doctrine).  
 98. See George S. McGraw, Defining and Defending the Right to Water and 
Its Minimum Core: Legal Construction and the Role of National Jurisprudence, 
8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 127, 154–55 (2011) (“Essentially . . . [the minimum 
core concept] posits that there are degrees of rights fulfillment, and that one of 
these degrees is a definable, basic threshold—or for our purposes, a minimum 
legal content—for socio-economic rights.”). 
 99. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 100. See Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights 
in China, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 359, 360–61 (1995) (“[Participation rights] are 
deontological in character, whereas . . . [provision rights] are consequentialist or 
utilitarian.”); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1759 (1988) (arguing for redistribution using positive rights 
up to a Pareto-optimal point, or “inequality that pays for itself”). 
 101. See Peerenboom, supra note 100, at 360–61 (“[Participation rights] are 
deontological in character . . . .”).  
2202 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2013) 
citizens hold participation rights as a protection against 
government interference with certain interests except within very 
limited, prescribed legal boundaries, regardless of the interests of 
the general citizenry.102 The CP Covenant’s guarantees of 
freedom of religion, freedom from racial, gender, or ethnic 
discrimination, freedom of speech, and freedom from arbitrary 
deprivation of property are classical formulations of participation 
rights.103  
Commentators often draw the distinction between the two 
types of rights as being “freedom to” rights (positive rights) and 
“freedom from” rights (negative rights).104 Put differently, 
provision rights require the government to take action, unless 
compelling countervailing considerations are demonstrated (for 
example, impossibility because of limited resources), whereas 
participation rights proscribe government action, unless 
compelling countervailing considerations are demonstrated (for 
example, freedom of speech unless interests of safety outweigh, as 
in shouting “fire” in a crowded theater).105 This Article draws the 
distinction between rights “to” some good or service (provision 
rights), and rights “in” an institution, resource, or process held in 
trust and controlled by the state for the benefit of its citizens 
(participation rights).106 
These are helpful distinctions, but difficult to clearly define. 
Even enforcement of provision rights requires the provision of 
state resources, and the availability of participation rights 
                                                                                                     
 102. See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 269 (“A successful claim of right, in the 
strong sense . . . has this consequence. If someone has a right to something, then 
it is wrong for the government to deny it to him even though it would be in the 
general interest to do so.”). 
 103. CP Covenant, supra note 15. The distinction between positive rights 
and negative rights is a difficult one to draw. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 
(contrasting positive rights, which command government action, with negative 
rights, which require freedom from government intervention). 
 104. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 (explaining that a positive right is a 
“claim to something” and a negative right is a “right that something not be done 
to one”). 
 105. Supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
 106. The difference between these two types of rights is similar to the 
difference between an individual buying a boat (“You have to give me that 
boat.”), and an individual buying an ownership interest in a company that owns 
a boat (“I get a say in how that boat is used.”). See Cross, supra note 11, at 864 
(providing an overview of positive and negative rights). 
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requires provision of an institution facilitating participation 
(courts, agencies, elections, informal stakeholder processes, 
etc.).107 As such, for purposes of this Article, the distinction 
between participation rights and provision rights is a distinction 
based not solely on the traditional “negative” and “positive” 
obligations of the state but also between the duties and 
appropriate remedy for violating the right at issue.108 Provision 
rights have substantive duties and remedies, whereas 
participation rights have procedural duties and remedies.109 The 
substantive duty of a provision right is provision of the good or 
service, and the remedy for the violation of a provision right is 
provision of the minimum core of goods or services guaranteed by 
the right.110 The substantive duty of a participation right is 
forbearance of state interference with guaranteed freedoms, 
absent a compelling state interest, and provision of the necessary 
process to facilitate participation in policy development and 
enforcement of infringements of freedom.111 The remedy for the 
infringement of a participation right is the provision of due 
process and demonstration of sufficiently compelling 
countervailing public interest.112 Where the government cannot 
demonstrate such a countervailing interest or cannot provide 
such due process, the government is precluded from interfering 
with the interest at issue.113 
                                                                                                     
 107. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864–65 (illustrating the difficulty of 
distinguishing positive and negative rights in the context of the claim that “all 
rights, including negative ones, require government enforcement”). 
 108. See, e.g., Lawrence Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural 
Due Process and Substantive Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 332–
33 (1987) (illustrating the difficulty in differentiating a constitutionally 
protected right and a revocable privilege).  
 109. Supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
 110. See Cross, supra note 11, at 868 (explaining that a positive right would 
not exist without a government to provide it); McGraw, supra note 98, at 154–55 
(framing the right to water as a “positive norm” requiring provision of a 
“minimum core” of water). 
 111. See Cross, supra note 11, at 864–68 (discussing the implications of 
positive and negative rights and concluding that negative rights require the 
government to abstain from interfering with those rights). 
 112. See id. at 867–68 (describing the process by which negative rights are 
provided by the United States Constitution). 
 113. See id. at 876 (arguing that constitutional rights “do not bestow rights 
upon individuals to take some action but only bestow rights to be free from 
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C. The Predominant Provision Rights Approach to Water 
Scholars, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and 
water policy advocates have generally framed the right to water, 
at both the international and domestic level, as a provision 
right.114 As such, international and domestic formulations of a 
right to water typically consider water a compelling interest that 
governments should progressively provide, subject to available 
resources, in language similar to that of the 2010 U.N. 
Resolution.115 Legal scholars writing in the field have almost 
universally framed an international human right to water as a 
provision right.116 Similar arguments have been echoed in 
scholarship describing or advocating a provision right to water at 
the national level.117 
                                                                                                     
certain rules limiting that action”). 
 114. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in 
the United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 
33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 785, 836–37 (2009) (explaining that 
water supply should be held in trust by the government and provided to the 
population through improved infrastructure); Implementing the Human Right to 
Water in the West: Conference Report, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2011) 
[hereinafter Willamette Conference Report] (concluding that the government has 
an obligation to provide water to its citizens, if not to every remote area, at least 
to designated locations where it can be accessed); Montgomery F. Simus & 
James G. Workman, The Water Ethic: The Inexorable Birth of a Certain 
Alienable Right, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 471 (2009) (arguing that an informal 
right to water has existed and should be allowed to grow into a more defined 
right in the future). But see Rhett B. Larson, Holy Water and Human Rights: 
Indigenous Peoples’ Religious-Rights Claims to Water Resources, 2 ARIZ. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 81, 95 (2011) (asserting that the right to water can be argued 
as a liberty right, in the context of religious affiliations with water in many 
cultures). 
 115. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 116. See, e.g., Willamette Conference Report, supra note 114, at 29 (“[T]his 
conception of the public trust as negative right contrasts with the human right 
to water which is generally regarded as a positive right, imposing a duty on the 
government to act in such a manner as to assure access to water and 
sanitation.”); McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 7 (arguing that “[a]ccess to adequate 
amounts of safe, useable fresh water” should be recognized as a right and 
provided to the population); McGraw, supra note 98, at 154–55 (framing the 
right to water as a “positive norm” requiring provision of a “minimum core” of 
water.). 
 117. See, e.g., Vrinda Narain, Water as a Fundamental Right: A Perspective 
From India, 34 VT. L. REV. 917, 923 (2009) (“[I]t might be more effective to 
articulate the right to water as a positive right rather than as a negative 
right.”). 
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The normative and descriptive positions taken by legal 
scholars are largely reflected in domestic law relating to the right 
to water.118 Currently, forty-one nations have “enshrined the 
right to water within their national constitutions, or have framed 
the right explicitly or implicitly within national legislation.”119 
For example, Article 43 of the Constitution of Kenya120 provides 
that “[e]very person has the right . . . to clean and safe water in 
adequate quantities.”121 Article 5 of Indonesia’s Law on Water 
Resources122 provides that the state guarantees individual access 
and availability of water for everyone residing within the 
nation.123 Article 66(2) of the Constitution of Ecuador124 
recognizes the right to “clean water.”125 In each case, however, the 
right is subject to progressive realization and available 
resources.126 The constitutions of both Uganda and Zambia move 
even further from the rights rhetoric to the “compelling interest” 
rhetoric, by framing the public interest in water as a government 
“objective” or “endeavor,” subject to available resources.127 
                                                                                                     
 118. See infra notes 119–31 (discussing provision and participation rights in 
water as provided by domestic constitutions, statutes, and judicial opinions).  
 119. See The Rights to Water and Sanitation in National Law, 
RIGHTTOWATER.INFO (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.righttowater.info/progress-so-
far/national-legislation-on-the-right-to-water (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (listing 
forty-one nations that have recognized water rights in constitutions, national laws, 
executive proclamations, judicial decisions, and proposed legislation) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 120. CONSTITUTION, art 43(1)(d) (2010) (Kenya).  
 121. Id.  
 122. Law on Water Resources, No. 7 of 2004 (Indon.), reprinted in 2 L. ENV’T & 
DEV. J. 118, 122 (2006) [hereinafter “Water Resources Law”], http://www.lead-
journal.org/content/06118.pdf. 
 123. See id. (“The State guarantees everyone’s right to obtain water for their 
minimum daily basic needs in order to achieve a healthy, clean, and productive 
life.”). 
 124. CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [C.P.] art. 66(2), 
available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html# 
mozTocId64283.  
 125. Id.  
 126. See, e.g., id. arts. 3(1), 11(8) (mandating that the right to water, like all 
other constitutional rights, “shall be developed progressively” through standards, 
case law, and public policy). 
 127. See CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA (1995) arts. I, XIV(b), 
http://www.uganda.at/Geschichte/verfassung_der_republik_Uganda_2008.pdf 
(establishing the right to “clean and safe water” as an “objective” that will “guide” 
the state in making and implementing policy decisions); CONST. OF ZAMBIA of 1991 
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Often, nations may lack an express right to water but infer 
such a right from other express rights on the grounds that the 
realization of any right depends on provision of a minimum core 
of primary needs.128 As noted above, the Supreme Court of India 
inferred the right to water from other express constitutional 
rights.129 A similar approach of judges inferring a provision right 
to water from other express rights has been arguably observed in 
Pakistan130 and Bangladesh.131 
The right to water under international law is similar to the 
right in India because, as in India, the right to water under 
international law is not express but instead must be considered 
implicit within other express provision rights.132 For example, the 
U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (HR Declaration) 
states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.”133 A 
right to water is arguably implied within the right to a standard 
                                                                                                     
(as amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) § 111, 112(d), http://www. 
parliament.gov.zm/downloads/VOLUME%201.pdf (stating that the government 
“shall endeavor” to provide clean and safe water, but that this policy principle is 
not “legally enforceable” in any court or tribunal). 
 128. See, e.g., Monique Passelec-Ross & Karin Buss, Water Stewardship in 
the Lower Athabasca River: Is the Alberta Government Paying Attention to 
Aboriginal Rights to Water?, 23 J. ENVT’L L. & PRAC. 69, 70 (2011) (discussing 
how provincial governments in Canada have inferred aboriginal water rights 
from express constitutional guarantees to a right of subsistence on traditional 
lands). 
 129. See Chameli Singh v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1051, 1053 
(India) (stating that the right to water is implied by the “right to life enshrined 
under Article 21” of the Indian Constitution); INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“No person 
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law.”). 
 130. See McGraw, supra note 98, at 176–77 (discussing General Secretary v. 
Director, (1994) SCMR 2061 (Pak.), in which the Pakistani Supreme Court 
declared that the right to have water free from pollution is essential to life 
itself). 
 131. See id. at 175 (discussing Farooque v. Bangladesh (Radioactive Milk 
Powder), (1996) WP 92/1996 S.C. ¶ 20 (Nepal), in which the Bangladeshi 
Supreme Court declared that the right to life includes the right to enjoyment of 
pollution-free water).  
 132. See McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 7 (noting that right to water must be 
inferred from an existing treaty or charter because such a right is not expressly 
provided by existing international law).  
 133. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) at 76 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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of living, because without water there is no living at all.134 
Indeed, on September 30, 2010, the U.N. Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) inferred from the HR Declaration that a right to water 
was “inextricably related to . . . the right to life and human 
dignity.”135  
Article 11 of the ESC Covenant recognizes a right to an 
adequate standard of living, health, food, and housing.136 The 
U.N. inferred a provision right to water from these guarantees in 
2002, under General Comment 15 to the ESC Covenant.137 The 
drafters of General Comment 15 draw the right to water from 
other express provision rights under the ESC Covenant, finding 
that the right to water is a “prerequisite for the realization of 
other human rights,” and “clearly falls within the category of 
guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of 
living . . . . The right to water is also inextricably related to the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health . . . and the 
rights to adequate housing and adequate food.”138 The ESC 
Covenant, however, requires only that states “take steps . . . to 
the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the [ESC Covenant].”139  
Some have also argued that the provision right to water has 
arisen as an independent right based on “customary international 
                                                                                                     
 134. See McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 8 (“It seems obvious that such a 
standard of living could not exist without an adequate supply of water suitable 
for drinking.”). 
 135. Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 
15th Sess., Sept. 13–Oct. 14, A/HRC/15/60, at 22–23 (Oct. 31, 2011). The 2010 
U.N. Resolution is similarly based on a right to water implied within the 
positive rights set forth in the ESC Covenant. See 2010 U.N. Resolution, supra 
note 6 (referencing General Comment 15 by the UNHRC and the ESC Covenant 
immediately before recognizing the right to safe and clean drinking water). 
 136. See ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at 50 (“The States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing . . . .”). 
 137. See General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 1 (stating that realization of 
the right to water is a “prerequisite for the realization of other human rights” 
recognized in the ESC Covenant).  
 138. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.  
 139. ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at 49. 
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law.”140 “Customary international law” means a “general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of 
legal obligation to such a degree as to effectively bind states in 
general.”141 For example, the Dublin Statement, a U.N. document 
on water management, declares that it is “vital to recognize the 
basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water and 
sanitation at an affordable price.”142 However, despite the 
growing voices favoring an express provision right to water as 
customary international law, few countries recognize an 
independent provision right to water; therefore, the right to water 
has likely not achieved the status of customary international 
law.143 As such, to the extent a right to water exists in 
international law, it is implied by existing provision rights.144 
Such an implied right mirrors the way in which the right to water 
is framed in domestic constitutions and legal scholarship, as a 
provision right provided by governments subject to progressive 
realization and available resources.145 The nature of the right to 
                                                                                                     
 140. See Sara De Vido, The Right to Water As an International Custom: The 
Implications in Climate Change Adaptation Measures, 6 CARBON & CLIMATE L. 
REV. 221, 224–25 (2012) (“Considering the evolution of State practice, national 
and international jurisprudence, and the activities of several international 
bodies, it is possible to affirm that at least the core content of the human right 
to water . . . has achieved the status of a customary international norm.”).  
 141. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987). 
 142. International Conference on Water and the Environment, Dublin, Ir., 
Jan. 26–31, 1992, The Dublin Statement and Report of the Conference, at 4, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/112, Annex I (Mar. 12, 1992) [hereinafter The Dublin 
Statement], http://docs.watsan.net/Scanned_PDF_Files/Class_Code_7_Confer 
ence/71-ICWE92-9739.pdf.  
 143. See Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: 
Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 
4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 354 (2005) (“Although water is not yet an 
individual right under customary international law, the amount of attention it 
has received indicates that it is moving in that direction.”). 
 144. See De Vido, supra note 140, at 361 (arguing that a human right to 
water is implied by existing provision rights to life and health contained within 
the ESC Covenant).  
 145. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [C.P.] 
arts. 3(1), 11(8), available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/ 
Ecuador/english08.html (establishing the progressive realization rule in 
Ecuador); cf. Wesley A. Cann, Jr., On the Relationship Between Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Need of Less-Developed Countries for Access to 
Pharmaceuticals: Creating A Legal Duty to Supply Under A Theory of 
Progressive Global Constitutionalism, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 755, 843 (2004) 
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water as an implied right is significant, because evaluation of 
water policy is thus inherently linked to provision of other goods 
or services rather than independently evaluated, and the right to 
water, as implicit rather than explicit, is given lower lexical 
priority in policy debates.146 
III. The Limitations of a Provision Right to Water 
To the extent the rights framework is employed solely to 
emphasize the need for water, such a framework is of limited 
value.147 The right to water cannot mean only a guarantee of 
water sufficient to keep a person alive.148 Every living person 
already has that. The question then is not whether people have or 
need enough water to live—that is both obvious and moot. The 
question is one of knowing the amount, quality, access, 
affordability, and allocation of water sufficient to achieve some 
standard of living, and the unique localized social and 
hydrological conditions affecting how that standard is 
determined.149 
                                                                                                     
(stating that the ESC Covenant guarantees to health and well-being—provision 
rights from which the right to water is derived—are “subject to progressive 
realization and available resources”). 
 146. See De Vido, supra note 140, at 225 (insinuating that the current 
“fragmented” approach to the right to water is “a consequence of the 
consideration of the human right to water as dependent [upon] other rights”). 
 147. See Brett Hartley & Heather J. Van Meter, The Human Right to Water: 
Proposal for A Human Rights-Based Prioritization Approach, 19 WILLAMETTE J. 
INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 66, 85 (2011) (arguing that if the right to water is 
predicated on the right to life alone, such a right would be “of little comfort to 
the millions . . . [with] disease, chronic illness, and shortened life expectancy” 
caused by shortages of potable water). 
 148. See id. (implying that a water rights structure that fails to promote 
quality of life in addition to the ability to live does not meet the adequate 
standard of living mandate enshrined in the ESC Covenant). 
 149. See JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 404 (3d 
ed. 1989) (recognizing that local hydrological conditions will have varying 
degrees of impact on water rights); Melina Williams, Privatization and the 
Human Right to Water: Challenges for the New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 469, 
498–500 (2007) (addressing issues of affordability, access, and allocation in an 
analysis of Bolivia’s attempt to uphold the standard of living outlined in General 
Comment 15 after privatizing water delivery in Cochabamba). 
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The recent decision in the South Africa’s Constitutional 
Court in Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg150 illustrates the 
challenges of relying on a provision right to water to achieve the 
objective of water policy and meet the interests of citizens.151 
South Africa was one of the first countries to adopt a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to water.152 Under Section 27 of 
the South African Constitution, “[e]veryone has the right to have 
access to . . . sufficient food and water.”153 Importantly, Section 27 
of South Africa’s Constitution provides a guarantee conditioned 
upon “progressive realization” similar to those guarantees under 
the ESC Covenant and other domestic constitutions discussed 
above.154  
The Mazibuko case centers on Phiri, a historically black and 
poor township of over one million residents in the City of 
Johannesburg with a disproportionately degraded and 
inadequate water infrastructure.155 Since 2001, the City has 
satisfied the constitutional guarantee of access to sufficient water 
through its Free Basic Water policy, which supplied six kiloliters 
of water (intended to equal about twenty-five liters per person per 
day) to each accountholder in Phiri.156 However, because of leaky 
                                                                                                     
 150. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.), 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/28.pdf. 
 151. See id. at 24 para. 48 (attempting to determine how much water the 
government must provide in order to meet the provision right to water 
guaranteed in the South African Constitution). 
 152. See Andrew Magaziner, The Trickle Down Effect: The Phiri Water 
Rights Application and Evaluating, Understanding, and Enforcing the South 
African Constitutional Right to Water, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 509, 580 
(2008) (“South Africa was one of the first nations to explicitly reserve the right 
to water for its citizens . . . .”). 
 153. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 27(1), http://www.info.gov.za/documents/consti 
tution/1996/a108-96.pdf.  
 154. See id. § 27(2) (“The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation 
of each of these rights.”); supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text (discussing 
progressive realization stipulations in the Constitutions of Ecuador, Uganda, 
and Zambia similar to Article 2(1) of the ESC Covenant).  
 155. See Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 6 para. 10–11 (discussing impoverished 
conditions in Phiri and the serious degree of corrosion permitted to occur in its 
water piping between the 1940s and the 1980s). 
 156. See id. at 4 para. 6, 46 para. 91 (stating that the City of Johannesburg 
introduced its Free Basic Water policy in 2001). The Free Basic Water policy 
was written to comply with national regulations on the minimum amount of 
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infrastructure, illegal connections, and unpaid use in excess of 
the six kiloliter limit, Johannesburg Water distributed about one 
third of its water supply to Soweto, but only generated one 
percent of its revenue from Soweto.157  
To address the problem of water sustainability, the City 
implemented a new approach in 2004 in Phiri.158 The City 
continued to deliver “free basic water” to every household in 
Phiri, with additional water delivered only when paid for in 
advance through newly installed prepaid meters.159 Many Phiri 
households consumed their entire six kiloliters of free basic water 
within the first two weeks of the month.160 Phiri residents filed a 
lawsuit against the City of Johannesburg, claiming that the 
                                                                                                     
water necessary to satisfy South Africa’s constitutional guarantee of a right to 
water. Id. at 9–11 paras. 19–23. However, the six kiloliter limit applied to each 
water connection; because these connections often served multi-household lots 
with multiple residents in each household, the end supply of water to each 
individual resident of a lot was “woefully inadequate.” Jackie Dugard, Civic 
Action and Legal Mobilisation: The Phiri Water Meters Case, in MOBILISING 
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES FROM RESEARCHERS AND 
PRACTITIONERS 71, 73 n.4 (Jeff Handmaker & Remko Berkhout eds., 2010).  
 157. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 6–7 paras. 
11–12, 179 (S. Afr.) (noting that “the rate of payment of municipal bills was less 
than 10%”); COALITION AGAINST WATER PRIVATISATION ET AL., THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST SILENT DISCONNECTIONS: PREPAID METERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE 
IN PHIRI, SOWETO 6 (2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Phiri.pdf (listing 
illegal water connections as a major contributing factor to Johannesburg 
Water’s decision to seek new methods for water distribution in poor South 
African townships like Phiri). 
 158. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 8 para. 15 (S. Afr.). 
 159. See id. at 7–8 paras. 13–14 (describing the rationale and 
implementation of “Operation Gcin’amanzi,” which means “to save water”). 
Johannesburg Water, acting with the City’s permission, abandoned its previous 
deemed consumption flat rate charge system because of rampant payment. See 
id. at 78 para. 139 (stating that the rate of payment for municipal bills under 
the flat rate system was less than ten percent). Other areas of the City 
continued to operate under the old flat rate system, or systems, which allowed 
for water to be purchased on credit. See id. at 13 para. 26 (recounting the trial 
court’s finding that the prepaid meter system was discriminatory because 
Soweto residents were not given the option of installing the kinds of credit 
meters that were available to white residents throughout Johannesburg).  
 160. See, e.g., Founding Affidavit of Lindiwe Mazibuko ¶ 101, Mazibuko v. 
City of Johannesburg 2008 (4) All SA 471 (S. Afr.), http://www.wits. 
ac.za/files/resdac0c995c698402abd0ce5633a7fe9ff.pdf (complaining that the 
allocated supply has never lasted for an entire month since the prepaid meter 
was installed in 2004). 
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City’s Free Basic Water policy and the decision to install prepaid 
water meters were unconstitutional.161  
The trial court found in favor of the residents of Phiri, 
holding that the Free Basic Water policy and the prepaid water 
meter installation violated Section 27 of the South African 
Constitution, and it ordered that fifty liters per day be 
established as the new free basic water supply.162 On appeal, the 
appellate court lowered the minimum free basic water supply to 
forty-two liters per person per day.163 The City then appealed to 
South Africa’s Constitutional Court.164 The Constitutional Court 
reversed the lower court rulings and upheld the prepaid water 
meter installation program and the minimum water amounts 
established by the City’s Free Basic Water policy.165 The 
Constitutional Court deferred to the expertise of agencies in 
establishing the minimum amount of water as a reasonable 
determination, and held that such technical determinations are 
not within the role of the judiciary.166 The Constitutional Court 
stated that courts are “ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where 
Court orders could have multiple social and economic 
consequences for the community.”167 The Mazibuko case 
illustrates three fundamental challenges of a provision right to 
                                                                                                     
 161. See Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 4 para. 6 (listing the major legal issues 
presented by Mazibuko). Mazibuko sought a court declaration that the state 
provide at least fifty liters per person per day in order to comply with Section 27 
of the South African Constitution. Id. at 13 para. 26.  
 162. See id. at 13–14 paras. 26–27 (summarizing the trial court’s findings). 
 163. See id. at 14–15 para. 28 (stating that the appellate court affirmed the 
trial court findings of unconstitutionality for the Free Basic Water policy and 
the prepaid water meter installation).  
 164. Id. at 16 para. 30. 
 165. Id. at 5 para. 9. 
 166. See id. at 30 para. 61 (suggesting instead that such decisions should be 
made by the executive or the legislature). 
 167. Id. at 27 para. 55 (citation omitted).  
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water: (1) enforceability;168 (2) economic sustainability;169 and 
(3) ecologic sustainability.170 
A. The Provision Right to Water and Enforceability 
The Mazibuko case is an example of the limits of enforcing 
provision rights.171 There are serious economic and political forces 
limiting the capacity of courts to effectively enforce provision 
rights.172 Evidence suggests that these obstacles are not unique to 
the Mazibuko case but that such obstacles are common and 
difficult to overcome wherever and whenever parties seek judicial 
enforcement of provision rights.173 
In upholding the City’s prepaid meter program, the 
Constitutional Court noted that, like provision rights in most 
contexts, South Africa’s constitution guaranteed only the 
“progressive realization” of a right to water.174 The Constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 168. See id. at 28 para. 57 (describing the difficulty of enforcing a claim 
based on a positive obligation delineated in the South African Constitution).  
 169. See id. at 55 para. 110 (justifying the decision that installing prepaid 
water meters was constitutional by finding that the meters helped foster 
economically sustainable provision of basic services as required by Section 
152(1)(b) of the South African Constitution).  
 170. See id. at 74 para. 139 (decrying the amount of water wasted by the 
aging infrastructure and the unsustainable deemed consumption system that 
predated Operation Gcin’amanzi). 
 171. See McGraw, supra note 98, at 198–99 (arguing that the Mazibuko 
Court intentionally limited its own powers to realize and enforce positive socio-
economic rights). 
 172. See Cross, supra note 11, at 882–88 (stating that “the economics of 
rights enforcement undermines the effectiveness of any positive right” and that 
“[c]ourts . . . avoid involving themselves in matters fundamental to the 
enforcement of positive rights” because of political pressure). Cross is 
pessimistic about the enforceability of provision rights because of the obstacles 
litigation costs pose to the poor, who are most likely to assert positive human 
rights. Id. at 880–81. He is also concerned about the political opposition to 
courts “running everything,” which leads to strict legislative and executive 
checks against judicial enforcement of provision rights. Id. at 887–88 (citation 
omitted). 
 173. See id. at 893–95 (citing empirical data demonstrating the courts have 
not typically been very active in enforcing provision rights); Hershkoff, supra 
note 95, at 1135 n.10 (referencing the familiar difficulties with judicial 
enforcement of affirmative duties).  
 174. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 19–20 para. 40 
(S. Afr.). The court cites Article 2(1) of the ESC Covenant for the proposition 
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Court held that the City was required only to take reasonable 
steps to progressively realize the interests in water guaranteed 
under South Africa’s constitution175 and that the constitution 
does not create “a self-standing and independent positive right 
enforceable irrespective” of available resources.176 Because 
provision rights are necessarily constrained in their realization 
by the ability of governments to take “appropriate and effective 
action,” governmental delays in realizing a provision right are 
easily explained, and that explanation is not easily challenged.177 
The common conditioning of provision rights on progressive 
realization and available resources makes such rights effectively 
unenforceable by the judiciary.178  
The problem of “progressive realization” is also an obstacle to 
enforcement of a provision right to water under international 
law.179 As already noted, to the extent a provision right exists 
under international law, such a right must be inferred from other 
express rights under the ESC Covenant.180 Article 11 of the ESC 
Covenant recognizes a right to “an adequate standard of living,” 
which implies a right to water, as noted by the U.N. in General 
Comment 15.181 The ESC Covenant, however, requires only that 
states “take steps . . . to the maximum of [their] available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the [ESC Covenant].”182 
                                                                                                     
that the “progressive realization” formulation of positive obligations “applies to 
most of the social and economic rights entrenched in our Constitution and is 
consistent with the principles of international law.” Id. 
 175. See id. at 36 para. 74 (discussing whether the City took the reasonable 
steps necessary to satisfy the progressive realization standard in Section 27(2) 
of the South African Constitution and concluding that the city was not 
unreasonable in its actions).  
 176. Id. at 25 para. 49 (citation omitted). 
 177. Cross, supra note 11, at 876–77. Of course, the “progressive realization” 
condition could simply be removed, but then courts are left imposing obligations 
on the state which the state may be unable to meet immediately, because those 
obligations require installation of costly and complex infrastructure. 
 178. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 633, 668 (1991) (noting the existence of provision rights in India’s 
constitution, but concluding that such rights are not judicially enforceable). 
 179. Infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.  
 180. Supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
 181. Supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.  
 182. ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at 49. 
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Just as in the Mazibuko example, any claims of a right to water 
implied by the ESC Covenant have the inherent weakness of not 
being immediately binding upon states, given the latitude of the 
language of the covenant for states to tailor compliance with 
covenant obligations to resource availability and progressive 
realization.183  
The nature of the judiciary is also a limitation on 
enforceability of a provision right to water.184 The Constitutional 
Court in Mazibuko upheld the City’s established amount and 
reversed the lower court rulings based on what the Constitutional 
Court called “an understanding of the proper role of courts in our 
constitutional democracy.”185 The Constitutional Court stated 
that 
[i]t is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine 
precisely what the achievement of any particular social and 
economic right entails and what steps government should take 
to ensure the progressive realization of the right. This is a 
matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the 
institutions of government best placed to investigate social 
conditions in the light of available budgets and to determine 
what targets are achievable in relation to social and economic 
rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of democratic 
accountability that they should do so for it is their programs 
and promises that are subjected to democratic popular 
choice.186 
The different opinions of what constitutes “sufficient water” 
of the three courts involved in adjudicating Mazibuko suggests 
                                                                                                     
 183. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 20 para. 40 
n.31 (S. Afr.) (discussing the slow-developing nature of the progressive 
realization concept outlined in Article 2(1) of the ESC Covenant); Lisa J. 
Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and 
the Right to Development, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 149 (2007) 
(confirming that Article 2(1) “make[s] [other ESC Covenant] provisions not 
immediately binding”). 
 184. Infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.  
 185. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 28 para. 57. In summarizing Lawrence 
Sager’s similar conclusions relating to the positive human right to health care, 
Frank Cross noted that “[g]iven these complexities, it is unclear that the 
judiciary is the best branch for making wise decisions about positive rights, even 
when acting sincerely.” Cross, supra note 11, at 905. 
 186. Mazibuko, 2010 (4) SA 1, at 30 para. 61. 
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that courts often are not well equipped for making the kind of 
technical determinations required in water management.187 
Executive agencies or legislatures could take two different 
approaches to more effectively guide judicial enforcement of 
provision rights, each equally problematic. The first would be to 
establish a broad, guiding principle in the formulation of the 
right and allow courts to enforce that principle on a case-by-case 
basis—for example, a simple guarantee of “sufficient water.” 
However, such ambiguity raises serious challenges in terms of 
enforcement.188 Where courts lack information and expertise 
relative to government budgets and revenue, the judicial 
enforcement of provision rights requiring government 
expenditures can create serious fiscal problems.189 Where courts 
lack information and expertise regarding local conditions, 
including population density, consumption patterns, and 
demographics, judicial enforcement of provision rights may prove 
inadequate or overreaching.190 
To avoid such indeterminacy, legislatures may take a second 
approach by quantifying the amount and quality of water 
                                                                                                     
 187. See Cross, supra note 11, at 902 (suggesting that, when confronted with 
the opportunity, judges will simply use “positive rights to advance their 
ideological policy preferences” rather than making pragmatic, policy-oriented 
decisions). Mark Tushnet notes that a “judge is rather more likely to pick the 
theory that points where he or she wants to go anyway, than to pick a theory 
and reluctantly find that it leads to conclusions he or she would have preferred 
to avoid.” MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
155 (1999). Cross points out that empirically establishing the prevalence of 
ideological or political judicial decision-making is difficult, given that “[m]ost 
judges would sooner admit to grand larceny than confess a political interest or 
motivation.” Cross, supra note 11, at 906 (quoting ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD 
STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 264 (1990) (quoting DONALD DALE 
JACKSON, JUDGES 18 (1974))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 188. See Cross, supra note 11, at 901 (“While all language is somewhat 
ambiguous, positive rights . . . suffer from particular indeterminacy. The reason 
for this indeterminacy is that such rights are consequentialist, requiring the 
judiciary to create a program that achieves a given result.”). 
 189. See PATRICK MONAHAN, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER, 
FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 126 (1987) (arguing that if 
courts were to enforce provision rights, they would become embroiled in the 
same budgetary and tax debates that the concept of judicial review was 
designed to avoid in the first place). 
 190. See Cross, supra note 11, at 901 (arguing that, when faced with 
“imperfect information” about specific conditions, judges “are likely to do very 
little to promote the ends commanded by [provision] rights”).  
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required to meet a provision right. As noted above, the City of 
Johannesburg, South Africa, attempted such an approach by 
establishing the six kiloliters per month per household 
standard.191 This standard, however, proved unworkable, 
partially because the government did not understand that 
households were much larger in Phiri than in other townships in 
the City.192 As such, in order to avoid the challenge of 
indeterminacy in judicial enforcement, codification of the 
provision right to water often forces a rigid legal establishment of 
minimum standards. Such rigid standards may not prove 
workable as conditions differ both temporally and spatially. To 
the extent that courts evaluate these minimum standards, they 
are left making ad hoc determinations of the viability of these 
minimum standards under different localized conditions.193 As 
with fleshing out vague and indeterminate guarantees of 
“sufficient” water, courts are often left making technical 
determinations for which they are ill-suited even when a 
minimum standard is established.194  
Establishing causation also poses an obstacle to judicial 
enforcement of a provision right to water. Droughts, floods, and 
waterborne epidemics impact human rights but are not 
necessarily human rights violations.195 The difficulty of 
establishing the government as the “cause,” and therefore the 
                                                                                                     
 191. See supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
City continued to offer a minimum supply of six kiloliters in Phiri and 
implemented a meter system for additional water). 
 192. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting how quickly Phiri 
households consumed the water provided by the government).  
 193. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (noting that the South 
African Constitutional Court has previously expressed the difficulties associated 
with deciding cases that have broad social and economic consequences); Cross, 
supra note 11, at 903–05 (illustrating the complexities associated with judicial 
enforcement of positive rights such as “a minimal level of subsistence”). 
 194. See Christine A. Klein & Ling-Yee Huang, Cultural Norms as a Source 
of Law: The Example of Bottled Water, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 507, 535 (2008) 
(arguing that state legislatures in the United States have failed to adequately 
update the “law governing the initial appropriation of water resources” and that 
courts deciding cases concerning bottled water “necessarily produc[e] reactive 
and fact-specific decisions, rather than comprehensive legislative guidance”).  
 195. See Bodanksy, supra note 80, at 519 (“Human rights are ‘human’ by 
virtue of not only their victims but also their perpetrators. And they represent 
human rights ‘violations’ only if there is some identifiable duty that some 
identifiable duty-holder has breached.”). 
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liable party, of a failure to adequately provide sufficient water, 
when water availability is influenced by global climate patterns 
and other factors outside of any government’s control,196 limits 
the enforceability of a provision right to water.197 While droughts, 
floods, or epidemics are often partially attributable to a failure of 
governance, courts are nevertheless incapable of evaluating 
where a natural disaster ends and governance failure begins in 
assessing causation,198 and thus enforcing a provision right to 
water.  
As already noted, courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate and 
enforce a provision right to water, as typically formulated.199 
Similarly, those citizens most likely to bring an action to enforce 
a provision right to water—the economically or socially 
disenfranchised—typically lack the means to effectively assert 
that right.200 Enforcement of rights requires resources just as 
                                                                                                     
 196. See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington 
Consensus, and Water Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 383–89 (2008) 
(explaining that “vastly altered precipitation patterns” resulting from global 
climate change affect the “total availability of water”). 
 197. Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights 
Litigation: A Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934 (2007)  
It would be impossible for a victim of global warming to show that one 
particular corporation or factory caused his injury. Any theory would 
need to allocate liability on the basis of market share of some other 
proxy for degree of responsibility, and although American courts 
sometimes do this, the difficulties of using such theories for global 
warming are considerable. Id.  
 198. See id. (noting that a victim of global warming would have to rely on a 
“theory . . . allocat[ing] liability on the basis of . . . [a] proxy for degree of 
responsibility, and although American courts sometimes do this, the difficulties 
of using such theories for global warming are considerable” (citation omitted)); 
Mark Pelling, Disaster Risk and Development Planning: The Case for 
Integration, INT’L DEV. PLANNING REV., Dec. 2003, at i–ix (discussing the 
challenges of assessing how governmental failures during the development 
planning phase expose areas to heightened risk in the event of natural 
disasters). 
 199. Supra notes 184–94 and accompanying text. The political ideology of 
judges can also skew outcomes in some judicial systems, either against 
conservation measures like water pricing or against efforts to improve 
distribution equity, including water subsidies. See supra note 187 and 
accompanying text (describing the possible correlation between political ideology 
and judicial decision making). 
 200. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR 5 (1991) (introducing 
the general assertion that those in poverty often “lack the necessary disposable 
income to pay for attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and other costs associated 
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much as the realization of rights. A provision right must be 
developed and implemented, often through litigation.201 When the 
parties most interested in the provision right lack resources to 
litigate, or when “opposing groups with greater resources can 
engage in strategic litigation and settlement to avoid significant 
precedents,” such a right is unlikely to be fully realized.202 
The challenge of judicial enforcement of a provision right to 
water is all the more complicated under international law. In 
addition to the problems of indeterminacy, progressive 
realization, and limited resources, international law typically 
only applies to disputes between states.203 As noted above, to the 
extent a provision right to water exists under international law, 
it must be inferred from other express provision rights under the 
ESC Covenant.204 However, unlike the CP Covenant, the ESC 
Covenant’s Optional Protocol is not yet binding, as an insufficient 
number of states have acceded to the Optional Protocol.205 Given 
                                                                                                     
with participation in the judicial process”). But see Mark A. Graber, The 
Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional 
Theory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 787 (1997) (noting that “organizers of poor people’s 
movements believe that the litigation campaigns of the 1960s helped numerous 
people receive aid or improved benefits”). 
 201. See Cross, supra note 11, at 880 (“Rights do not enforce themselves. 
They require judicial decisions interpreting and enforcing their terms. Those 
decisions in turn require that a case or controversy come before the courts.”). 
 202. Id. at 881–83. There are ways to ameliorate this problem, such as 
attorney’s fee provision requirements and public service attorneys. See, e.g., 
Allen K. Yu, Enhancing Legal Aid Access Through an Open Source Commons 
Model, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 373, 384–85 (2007) (advocating for a virtual “legal 
aid commons” through which public service practitioners could pool resources to 
more efficiently serve indigent clients).  
 203. See JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 28–71 (2d ed. 
2010) (outlining various mechanisms created by the United Nations for the 
protection of human rights, and noting the limited circumstances where claims 
can be brought before international tribunals by non-state parties). 
 204. See ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at Art. 11 (“The States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family . . . and to the continuous improvement of living 
conditions.”); General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 8 (discussing states’ 
obligations to “ensure that natural water resources are protected from 
contamination”).  
 205. See ESC Covenant, supra note 19, at 50–51 (stating that parties to the 
ESC Covenant “recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living . . . including adequate food,” but not expressly stating that parties 
recognize a right to water); General Comment 15, supra note 26, ¶ 3 (asserting 
that the ESC Covenant provides a right to water because the right “clearly falls 
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the lack of a binding Optional Protocol, the ESC Covenant lacks 
adjudicative processes and enforcement mechanisms, making it 
“normatively and jurisprudentially underdeveloped compared to 
the [CP Covenant].”206   
Courts are limited in their capacity to enforce provision 
rights because the typical formulation of such rights raises the 
challenges of indeterminacy or rigidity,207 establishing 
causation,208 and satisfying the condition of “progressive 
realization.”209 Just because adequate and affordable water for all 
is an indisputable “good” does not mean that a judicially 
enforceable right to such water is also “good.” This is because the 
right to water is bound to the ability of the government to provide 
that good sustainably and effectively and the capacity of citizens 
to police and enforce that right.210  
B. The Provision Right to Water and Economic Sustainability 
In addition to problems of enforceability, which are typical of 
provision rights in general, the provision right to water raises 
challenges of economic sustainability. Water is different than the 
objects of other provision rights regimes because treating water 
as an economic commodity has always been problematic. Adam 
Smith famously wrote of the “water–diamond paradox,” noting 
that water has a high use value but low exchange value, whereas 
a diamond has a low use value but high exchange value.211 The 
                                                                                                     
within the category of guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of 
living” and is “inextricably related to the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health”). 
 206. SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 
163 (2d ed. 2004); see also Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008) 
[hereinafter Optional Protocol to the CP Covenant]. 
 207. Supra notes 184–94 and accompanying text.  
 208. Supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.  
 209. Supra notes 179–86 and accompanying text.  
 210. See Cross, supra note 11, at 877 (arguing that “effective rights 
enforcement requires plaintiffs with ability and resources”).  
 211. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 28 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library ed. 1965) (1776). Plato 
framed the issued somewhat differently. See PLATO, Euthydemus, in, PLATO: 
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water–diamond paradox illustrates the difficulty of effectively 
valuing a resource of infinite use value, but limited exchange 
value.212 The price of water, influenced by actual or perceived 
notions of scarcity, does not accurately reflect the true value of 
water.213 Water is thus undervalued because consumers 
inaccurately perceive it has low production costs and greater 
supply than demand. This public perception influences political 
actors who set low water rates for water utilities, which are 
                                                                                                     
COMPLETE WORKS 708, 743 (John M. Cooper ed., Rosamond Kent Sprague trans., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1997) (“For it is the rare thing . . . which is the precious one, 
and water is cheapest, even thoughg . . . it is the best.” (citation omitted)). For a 
modern critique of the classic framing of the concept, see Michael V. White, 
Doctoring Adam Smith: The Fable of the Diamonds and Water Paradox, 34 HIST. 
POL. ECON. 659 (2002), arguing that Smith’s failure to employ a marginal utility 
analysis prevented him from solving the “paradox.” 
 212. See W.M. Hanemann, The Economic Conception of Water, in WATER 
CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? MARCELINO BOTIN WATER FORUM 2004, at 61 (Peter P. 
Rogers et al. eds., 2006) (analyzing different economic approaches to the 
valuation of water in light of its distinct features as an economic commodity). 
Water is unique as an economic commodity for reasons other than its relatively 
low exchange value compared to its use value. Water has unique spiritual and 
cultural meaning, which makes it less easily analyzed in accordance with the 
“rational actor” of classical economics. See VERONICA STRANG, THE MEANING OF 
WATER 213 (2004) (“The most central themes of meaning—water as the essence 
of life, as the substance of social and spiritual being, as a matter of life and 
death—are clearly integral to assessments of its quality.”). Water is unevenly 
distributed across time and space, sometimes far from population centers, and 
the climatic influence on its variability unpredictable, particularly with global 
climate change. See Hanemann, supra, at 72–74 (explaining how water’s 
“mobility” and “variability” complicate the matching of supply and demand). As 
of 2004, “six countries—Brazil, Russia, Canada, Indonesia, China, and 
Columbia—account for half of the world’s total renewable supply of freshwater.” 
Id. at 73 (citation omitted). In California, two-thirds of the state’s population 
lives in the south, which receives less than 10% of the state’s total precipitation, 
and 80% of that precipitation occurs between October and March, while three 
quarters of the water use occurs between April and September. Id. (citation 
omitted). This makes water transport and planning costly, and water provision 
and pricing as inherently “unequal” as its distribution, with variability and 
distance from population requiring costly infrastructure projects for storage and 
transportation, not to mention treatment. See id. at 74–76 (describing the 
challenges associated with transporting and sanitizing water). Water is also 
both a private good (for example, bottled water) and a public good (for example, 
in situ water uses like fishing or swimming). Id. at 70–72.  
 213. See Hanemann, supra note 212, at 76 (explaining how “the prices which 
most users pay for water reflect, at best, its physical supply cost and not its 
scarcity value”). 
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regulated as natural monopolies.214 The unique challenge of 
pricing water and recovery costs of water treatment and delivery 
can be aggravated by a provision right to water.  
This aggravation results because the provision right to water 
is typically formulated in a way that either ignores, or is hostile 
to, the idea of water as a valuable commodity requiring expensive 
infrastructure to fully develop.215 For example, some have argued 
that the full cost recovery and water pricing is inconsistent with 
the idea of a right to water.216 They argue that “[i]nstead of 
commodifying water even further, we need to recover it by 
treating it as part of the commons and by strengthening 
community participation in water management.”217  
Such a formulation of the provision right to water is 
counterproductive for three primary reasons. First, many 
countries are reluctant to recognize any right to water because 
they are concerned that a “[provision right] to water may mean 
free provision of clean water . . . which they simply cannot afford” 
without recovering costs from consumers.218 As such, 
                                                                                                     
 214. See id. at 77–78 (asserting that there is a tendency to underprice water 
in the United States because after a major water system is put in place “water 
agencies are often politically locked into a regime of low water prices focused 
narrowly on the recovery of the historical cost of construction”). 
 215. See The Dublin Statement, supra note 142, at 4 (noting inefficient use 
of water and pointing out that the resource “has an economic value in all its 
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good”). “[I]t is vital to 
recognize . . . the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water 
and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic 
value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the 
resource.” Id. 
 216. See Bluemel, supra note 30, at 963–65 (explaining how “[t]reating 
water as an economic good without limitation as is done under the principle of 
full cost recovery can lead to inequities”). 
 217. MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE 
CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 210 (2002); see also SHIVA, supra note 
64, at ix–x (classifying a contemporary “clash of . . . two water cultures” as 
between “a culture that sees water as sacred and treats its provision as a duty 
for the preservation of life and another that sees water as a commodity, and its 
ownership and trade as fundamental corporate rights”). Shiva contends: “The 
culture of commodification is at war with diverse cultures of sharing, of 
receiving and giving water as a free gift.” Id. at x. 
 218. Asit K. Biswas, Water as a Human Right in the MENA Region: 
Challenges and Opportunities, 23 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 209, 215 
(2007) (“Since [a provision right to water] simply cannot be achieved within the 
foreseeable future, these countries prefer not to recognize this concept until 
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formulations of a provision right to water hostile to cost recovery 
and appropriate pricing often discourage states from applying a 
rights framework to their water policy because they are 
understandably reluctant to assume obligations that they are 
unable to meet.219 
Second, where a provision right to water requires piped 
delivery to the point of use of high-quality-treated water at low or 
no cost, lack of cost recovery results in degraded treatment and 
delivery infrastructure and, ultimately, inadequate delivery of 
poor-quality water.220 There is a relationship between the 
“economic sustainability” of water provision, including consistent 
delivery and water quality, and the “recovery of costs through . . . 
[consumer] tariffs that are equitably assigned based on ability-to-
pay.”221 The challenges faced by India, Bolivia, and South Africa 
discussed above each illustrate how a provision rights approach 
to water may lead to a failure to properly price water and fully 
recover costs and ultimately undermine the rationales behind a 
right to water. 
Third, where the provision right to water precludes or 
discourages cost recovery and water pricing, it also discourages 
needed investment in water infrastructure.222 The capital 
                                                                                                     
their responsibilities and accountabilities are clarified, as well as those of the 
consumers.”). 
 219. See Stephen C. McCaffrey & Kate J. Neville, Small Capacity and Big 
Responsibilities: Financial and Legal Implications of a Human Right to Water 
for Developing Countries, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 679, 685 (2009) 
(observing that many countries party to the ESC Covenant “simply do not have 
the financial and capacity-related resources to implement the items identified as 
core obligations in relation to the right to water”); Biswas, supra note 218, at 
215 (stating that some countries disfavor recognizing a provision right to water 
because they are “unsure of the legal implications if they approve the overall 
philosophy”).  
 220. Cf. James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water 18 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 94, 115 (2006) (“[T]he fact that the very poor do pay for water, 
and pay quite a bit in relative terms, suggested that they both can and will pay 
for piped water. Thus the principle of ‘full cost recovery’—charging a price to 
cover costs and profit—has seemed both possible and desirable.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 221. Jeffry S. Wade, Privatization and the Future of Water Services, 20 FLA. 
J. INT’L L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 179, 195–96 (2008). 
 222. In 2000 the United Nations adopted its “Millennium Development 
Goals” (MDGs), which included the goal “to halve, by the year 2015, . . . the 
proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.” 
2224 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2013) 
investment needed for adequate water and sanitation 
infrastructure over the next twenty years exceeds $100 billion per 
year, with regions in the most need least able to absorb those 
costs.223 Much of the growing challenge of global water stress can 
be attributed to a dramatic shortfall in necessary capital to fund 
improvements in water infrastructure.224 It is simply not possible 
to meaningfully implement a right to water without dramatic 
increases in capital expenditures in water infrastructure.225 Such 
                                                                                                     
United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). In tandem with these “lofty expectations,” the ESC 
Covenant “places at minimum a moral responsibility on wealthy nations and 
international financial institutions for seeing that [the MDGs] are fulfilled.” 
McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 685. Framing the solution in such a 
manner may have left some countries in an untenable position: they were 
discouraged from investing on their own and now are unable to rely on 
wealthier nations as the ESC Covenant originally envisioned given “today’s 
economic and financial climate.” See id. (describing how the high demands of the 
MDGs and the ESC Covenant have put significant pressure on state parties). 
 223. See Salzman, supra note 220, at 115 (observing in 2006 that the capital 
investment needed for water and sanitation infrastructure approached $100 
billion per year over the next twenty-five years and that “the weak financial 
resources of developing country governments prevent them from absorbing the 
costs of water provision upgrades” (citation omitted)). 
 224. See Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing 
Countries via Private Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 
94–95 (1995) (explaining how “[t]raditional sources of funding for [water] 
infrastructure have not met the critical needs of developing countries”); 
CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 1 (asserting that water must be treated as 
an economic good and investment sources tapped more efficiently to tackle 
funding deficits). Investments of at least $100 billion annually would have been 
required to achieve the MDGs when they were originally proposed. See id. 
(noting that the World Water Council in 2000 presented a report suggesting 
that meeting water goals required “additional annual investments of about $100 
billion”). Africa has 38% of its population unserved by safe water, Asia has 19% 
(52% without access to sanitation services), and Latin America and the 
Caribbean have 15% without access to safe water (22% without sanitation 
services). Id. at 5. The western United States and Ethiopia have roughly similar 
climates and hydrologic conditions, yet because of investment in infrastructure, 
the western United States has 5,000 cubic meters worth of water storage per 
person, while Ethiopia has only 50 cubic meters. Id. In 2003, the annual 
shortfall of needed capital was estimated to be between $10 and $32 billion, 
with population growth in developing countries far outstripping efforts to make 
up lost ground. See id. at 3 (noting that, depending on the standards used, the 
extra investment required is $10 billion on the low end and $17 to $32 billion on 
the high end (citation omitted)).  
 225. See Meera Mehta, Thomas Fugelsnes & Kameel Virjee, Financing the 
Millennium Development Goals for Water and Sanitation: What Will It Take?, 21 
INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 239 (2005) (examining whether African 
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dramatic increases will not come unless there is support for 
effective water pricing and full cost recovery.226  
Where the right to water is framed as a right to water “free of 
economic encumbrances,”227 such a right is counterproductive to 
the development and expansion of affordable clean water supplies 
for all. The challenge presented in formulating a right to water is 
to meet the purpose of such a right—protecting the 
disadvantaged—while at the same time ensuring that water 
provision is economically sustainable by treating water as a 
valuable and often scarce resource.228 The recent World Water 
Commission strongly advocated for full cost pricing of water 
services, noting that “the single most immediate and important 
measure that we can recommend is the systematic adoption of 
full cost pricing for water services.”229 The concern, however, is 
the impact full cost pricing of water will have on the poor in 
developing countries.230 
                                                                                                     
countries can meet the MDGs given “large funding gaps”). See Briscoe, supra 
note 37, at 459, for an examination of different water infrastructure financing 
mechanisms. 
 226. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 13 (“Sustainable financing for 
water systems will require greatly improved cost recovery from their users and 
increased management efficiency.”); Mehta et al., supra note 225, at 239–40 
(arguing that African countries “will need to implement cost recovery policies” in 
attempting to reach the MDGs). Water infrastructure is uniquely capital 
intensive. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 10. In the United States, “the 
ratio of capital investment to revenue is twice as high in water as in natural 
gas, and 70% higher than electricity and telecommunications.” Id. (internal 
citation omitted).  
 227. See, e.g., Hardberger, supra note 143, at 349 (describing the “basic 
premise” of General Comment 15 as providing an unqualified right to water); 
BARLOW, supra note 93, at 168 (asserting that General Comment 15 is “an 
authoritative interpretation that water is a right”). 
 228. See Savenije & van der Zaag, supra note 49, at 98–104 (arguing that 
water pricing should serve the purpose of financial sustainability through cost 
recovery with equity considerations achieved through increasing block tariffs). 
 229. WORLD WATER COMM., A WATER SECURE WORLD 33 (2000); see also Peter 
Rogers, Radhika de Silva & Ramesh Bhatia, Water is an Economic Good: How to 
Use Prices to Promote Equity, Efficiency, and Sustainability, 4 WATER POL’Y 1, 
1–17 (2002) (“We argue in this paper that the conventional wisdom is 
incorrect—increasing prices can improve equity. Higher water rates allow 
utilities to extend services to those currently not served and those currently 
forced to purchase water from vendors at very high prices.”). 
 230. See Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water, 
21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 109–10 (2010) (observing that some developing 
countries fear that expanded privatization of water infrastructure with the aid 
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The poor in developing countries often pay up to twenty-five 
times more for water from private water vendors than those who 
have access to a regular tap supply.231 The charges imposed by 
water vendors are not only evidence of the inequity resulting 
from certain water policies but are also evidence that expanding 
access to tapped and treated water can reduce expenditures on 
water by the poor. However, such expansion requires investment 
in infrastructure. When infrastructure for delivery and treatment 
go unfunded because of a failure to generate revenue and recover 
costs, water delivery becomes inconsistent, water quality 
decreases, and the poor suffer most.232 An effective cost-recovery 
mechanism encourages capital investments and facilitates 
lending for start-up costs on water treatment and distribution 
infrastructure by protecting lenders’ expectations of repayment 
and investors’ returns, and ensures sufficient revenues for 
maintenance and improvements. Where a provision right to 
water is framed in such a way as to interfere with full cost 
recovery and appropriate water pricing, the right is 
counterproductive to its presumed end of protecting the 
economically disadvantaged. 
Two counterarguments could be laid against policies directed 
at full cost recovery and water pricing. The first is that large 
general governmental subsidies allow for payment of water 
services and infrastructure maintenance and upgrades without 
requiring consumers to pay water tariffs. An alternative 
                                                                                                     
of foreign corporations would subject the “poor . . . [to] the adverse impact of 
high prices and service cut-offs” (citation omitted)). 
 231. ROUSE, supra note 71, at 16, 47; see also Sudhirendar Sharma, 
Watermarkets Exclude the Poor, in THE VALUE OF NATURE: ECOLOGICAL POLITICS 
IN INDIA 141, 145 (Smitu Kothari, Imtiaz Ahmad & Helmut Reifeld eds., 2003) 
(“World Bank sponsored studies indicate that urban poor already pay five times 
the municipal rate for water in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire; 25 times more in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh; and 40 times more in Cairo, Egypt.”). 
 232. See ARTHUR C. MCINTOSH, ASIAN WATER SUPPLIES: REACHING THE URBAN 
POOR 35 (2003) (“Water and poverty are linked by private operators with 
concessions promising to bring investment funds to the table to improve 
coverage, which they have not done, and water and poverty are linked by the 
poor suffering as a consequence.” (emphasis in original)). One of the proposed 
strategies to combat such problems is to “[d]evelop mechanisms for cost recovery 
that provide appropriate incentives to achieve stated policy objectives: for 
example, with regard to subsidy and financial performance.” Id. at 69 (emphasis 
omitted). 
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approach to privatization of water services and infrastructure to 
achieve effective cost recovery is public financing of water 
infrastructure and services through taxation. Advocacy for the 
provision right to water is often coupled with arguments in favor 
of large general water subsidies as a means of ensuring expanded 
access and maintenance of water infrastructure to poor 
communities and avoiding rate increases often associated with a 
private water sector.233 General water subsidies in developing 
countries are “motivated predominantly by social objectives,” 
including ensuring water provision to the poor, under the 
assumption that the poor cannot afford to pay for piped, treated 
water.234  
Currently, cost recovery of drinking water services in 
developing countries is about 35% on average, with water prices 
“set at a fraction of the marginal costs of supply.”235 The fiscal 
burden of underpricing water in developing countries can be 
conservatively estimated at $13 billion per annum, with total 
subsidies for drinking water in developing countries reaching in 
excess of $45 billion per year.236 As already noted above, 
empirical evidence on the price paid by the poor to water vendors 
suggests that the poor would be better able to afford effectively 
priced tapped water than prices they often pay to vendors in 
areas where publicly financed water provision is absent, 
unreliable, or unsafe.237  
                                                                                                     
 233. See Elizabeth Burleson, Emerging Law Addressing Climate Change 
and Water, 5 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 489, 496–99 (2010) (advocating for 
continued public participation in water management, including “sensible 
subsidies” (citation omitted)); Jennifer Naegele, What Is Wrong with Full-
Fledged Water Privatization?, 6 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 99, 100–01 (2004) 
(arguing for public management of water systems and asserting that after 
privatization, “[p]oor and rural communities are often left in a worse position 
than before privatization because they can no longer afford the sharply 
increased rates and are sometimes cut off from service altogether”). 
 234. André de Moor & Cees van Beers, The Perversity of Government 
Subsidies for Energy and Water, in GREENING THE BUDGET: BUDGETARY POLICIES 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT 24, 32–38 (J. Peter Clinch et al. eds., 2002). 
 235. Id. at 36.  
 236. Id. at 36–37. 
 237. See id. at 39 (concluding that “[r]eforming current water-pricing 
practices will . . . generate the necessary resources to expand public water 
services, while governments and banking institutions could then provide credit 
facilities to low-income groups to safeguard an easy access to public drinking 
water”); ROUSE, supra note 71, at 47–49 (offering various approaches to 
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The challenge for a publicly financed, general subsidy 
approach to water provision is that regulators subject to political 
pressure set water rates.238 As such, regulators keep rates low, if 
charged or collected at all, with the water sector receiving large 
general subsidies to offset lack of cost recovery.239 As will be 
discussed in more detail below, large general subsidies and low 
rates and collection result in significant waste of water resources 
because there is no incentive for conservation.240 Furthermore, 
public financing of the water sector has demonstrated costs 
associated with waste and inefficiency. Furthermore, general 
subsidies for drinking water favor the rich, as the rich are more 
typically connected to public water systems.241  
Additionally, general subsidies interfere with integrated 
water resource management (IWRM). IWRM is a process 
requiring coordinated development and management of water 
across different sectors and their various uses of water to 
“equitably maximize economic and social welfare without 
compromising sustainability and environmental quality.”242 
                                                                                                     
improving the valuation of water so as to assist the poor). 
 238. See Darwin C. Hall, Public Choice and Water Rate Design, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER PRICING REFORMS 189, 189–212 (Ariel Dinar ed. 
2000) (discussing how the Los Angeles Blue Ribbon Committee on Water Rates, 
appointed by Mayor Tom Bradley in the early 1990s after an extended drought, 
evaluated various models and policy choices for setting water rates). 
 239. See Ariel Dinar, Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WATER PRICING REFORMS 1, 7 (Ariel Dinar ed. 2000) 
(noting that “[p]ricing reforms are often complicated by financial crises and low 
cost recovery of the investment in the water system” and that governments 
must thus “subsidize the budgets of the irrigation departments”). 
 240. See Thompson, supra note 9, at 24–25 (noting that the United States 
has reduced water subsidies in an effort to improve water valuation and other 
nations have sought to “to charge urban residents the full cost of delivered 
water”). See generally NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES: 
HOW TAX DOLLARS CAN UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY (Island 
Press 2001) (1997) (exploring the ill effects of certain subsidies on various 
sectors, including water); Glennon, supra note 40, at 1882–84 (advocating for 
the elimination of general subsidies in the United States water sector to “gain 
people’s attention about their water use through their pocketbooks” and noting 
that general water subsidies lead to the price of water being “ridiculously low”).  
 241. See ROUSE, supra note 71, at 47 (“Most commonly, there are general 
subsidies which give most benefit to the ‘rich’, but which are generally 
insufficient for sustainability, with the result that the service declines and the 
necessary extensions to distribution systems to serve the poor are not funded.”). 
 242. GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP, TAC BACKGROUND PAPERS NO. 4: 
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IWRM is broadly recognized as the prevailing paradigm for water 
governance and management.243 Effective IWRM requires that 
water revenues and expenditures be integrated in order to 
monitor nonrevenue water resulting from illegal connections or 
leaks, and to evaluate water utility performance.244 General 
subsidies, along with ineffective water pricing and failure to 
achieve full cost recovery, “hamper expanding and improving the 
public water system because water companies lack the necessary 
financial resources to do so.”245  
The second argument against policies favoring full cost 
recovery and water pricing is based on concerns about the risks 
associated with privatization of water resources. Concerns over 
cost recovery, pricing, and capital investment in infrastructure 
are often conflated with advocacy for water resource and 
infrastructure privatization. Privatization of water services, 
supply, and infrastructure is a global trend that has created 
challenges in many nations, including Bolivia, as illustrated 
above.246 Privatization is advocated on the one hand as a way of 
facilitating access to capital and technical expertise, promoting 
efficiency, reducing costs through competitive bidding, expanding 
                                                                                                     
INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 64 (2000). 
 243. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., A Federal Act to Promote Integrated 
Water Management: Is the CZMA a Useful Model?, 42 ENVTL. L. 201, 212–13 
(2012) (discussing the benefits and goals of IWRM). 
 244. See Brendan McNallen, Fixing the Leaks in Brazil’s Water Law: 
Encouraging Sound Private Sector Participation Through Legal and Regulatory 
Reform, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 147, 154 (2006) (noting the economic benefits of 
having private sector participation in the water sector). 
 245. De Moor & van Beers, supra note 234, at 38. 
 246. See Arnold, supra note 114, at 796, 798 (stating that the privatization 
of the water supplies and infrastructures is a global trend that is appearing 
prominently in developing countries, but has led to intense conflicts over a 
variety of issues and faces public opposition in places such as Bolivia); Briscoe, 
supra note 38, at 302 (noting that there is a global trend of an increase in 
private investment in developing countries’ infrastructures). In 2000, ninety-
three countries had municipal water systems that underwent some form of 
privatization, as developing countries turned to large corporations for 
investments to improve water infrastructure, and as loans from organizations 
like the World Bank and regional development banks are conditioned upon 
privatization. Violeta Petrova, Note, At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold: 
Water Privatization and the Human Right to Water, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 577, 
577–78 (2006). 
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access, and improving quality.247 On the other hand, some argue 
that privatization is a dereliction of the government’s public trust 
in a shared common resource and unduly burdens the poor as 
water rates are raised to ensure debts are repaid and profits 
secured.248 Although the merits of privatization are beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is important to note that cost recovery and 
effective and reasonable pricing of water as a valuable commodity 
are not synonymous with privatization.249 
C. The Provision Right to Water and Ecologic Sustainability 
A provision right to water framed in a manner opposed to 
water pricing and cost recovery is not only counterproductive to 
its presumed end of protecting disadvantaged communities but it 
also poses risks to ecologic sustainability and human health. 
Appropriate water pricing encourages sustainable use.250 
                                                                                                     
 247. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 700 (“Some see [private 
sector] involvement as an efficient way of tapping into capital and technical 
expertise, thereby achieving both access and conservation goals, increasing the 
network of official water service provision, and increasing the quality and 
efficiency of that service.”). 
 248. See id. at 700–01 (“Others see private sector involvement as a violation 
of the right of people to shared, common resource, and as further alienating poor 
communities by depriving those without means of the ability to pay for 
necessary water resources.”); Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Erin Derrington, 
Investment in Water and Wastewater Infrastructure: An Environmental Justice 
Challenge, a Governance Solution, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2010, at 
3, 4 (noting criticism of water privatization in China where there are claims that 
companies are benefiting at the expense of the poor by having high profit 
margins). 
 249. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 701 (noting that the South 
African constitution allows for the payment of water services but does not allow 
for the denial of basic water access to those that cannot pay, placing a financing 
or political burden on the government). Corporatized publicly owned utilities, 
effective and transparent regulatory oversight, and public–private partnerships 
have the potential to achieve many of the benefits of privatization, including 
effective pricing and affordable service to poor communities. See generally 
ROUSE, supra note 71. 
 250. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 18 (arguing that “full cost 
recovery from users is the ideal long-term aim”); Priceless, ECONOMIST (July 17, 
2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1906846 (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) 
(noting that the colossal underpricing of water leads to overuse and waste, and 
contending that sensible water pricing, reflecting actual costs of treatment and 
transport, would correct the challenge of water conservation) (on file with the 
THE NEW RIGHT IN WATER 2231 
According to a World Bank senior executive, “water pricing is an 
essential instrument to enhance the sustainability of the 
resource.”251 Free or heavily subsidized water services lead 
invariably to waste of water resources with implications for 
human health, intergenerational equity, and the environment as 
water is withdrawn faster than it is naturally restored.252 
There is a growing awareness that large general water 
subsidies produce waste that is not ecologically sustainable, 
particularly in water-scarce regions, and that general subsidies 
for water are harmful in the long run to the environment.253 
Large general water subsidies are a major cause of 
overdevelopment and environmental degradation in arid 
regions.254 In developing countries in particular, general water 
subsidies have been linked to severe environmental damage such 
as salinity contamination of rivers, land subsidence, and loss of 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 251. Marwaan Macan-Markar, World Bank Backs Privatizing Water, Critics 
Dismayed, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 17, 2003; see also Petrova, supra note 246, 
at 587 (quoting the report).  
 252. See MYERS & KENT, supra note 240, at 123–31 (describing how water 
shortages and a lack of clean water in developing countries lead to deaths from 
water-related diseases, economic harm because of the time that people take  
each day to find water, and environmental damage through the drainage of 
wetlands and the depletion of fish stocks); Glennon, supra note 40, at 1883 
(encouraging a reform of the present system by eliminating subsidies as a 
strategy that “would gain people’s attention about their water use through their 
pocketbooks” and noting that water prices are “ridiculously low”). 
 253. See Peter P. Rogers, Water Governance, Water Security and Water 
Sustainability, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? 3, 4–10 (Peter P. Rogers et 
al. eds., 2006) (discussing water sustainability issues); Jennifer Hoffpauir, The 
Environmental Impact of Commodity Subsidies: NEPA and the Farm Bill, 20 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 253–55 (2009) (explaining that the increase in the 
amount of land used for farming has led to an increase in soil erosion, requiring 
the use of more pesticides and fertilizers that create lasting environmental 
impacts). 
 254. See David L. Feldman & Helen Ingram, Multiple Ways of Knowing 
Water Resources: Enhancing the Statutes of Water Ethics, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L 
L. 1, 7 (2009) (“[M]any ecologists have come to see subsidies provided by 
government to various groups of water users as a major cause of 
overdevelopment and damage to the environment.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16–
25 (1992) (explaining that, among other things, increased environmental 
demands to maintain fisheries and wildlife in the arid West have led to the end 
of large subsidized water storage facilities and distribution systems). 
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biodiversity.255 Where water in general is underpriced because of 
large general subsidies, more water is applied to crops, leading to 
erosion, and sediment and salinity contamination of rivers.256 
Where drinking water is underpriced because of large general 
subsidies, the lack of incentive to avoid wasting water in domestic 
uses results in water mining or “overdraft,” where water is 
withdrawn faster than it is naturally recharged, with reduced 
flow impacting wildlife and nutrient transport and cycling.257  
The environmental risk posed by a provision rights-based, 
low-cost or freewater policy is mirrored by other risks posed to 
public health. General Comment 15, as an example of the 
provision rights formulation, raises important questions as to 
how public health can be appropriately prioritized in a provision 
rights approach.258 For example, does the priority given to 
personal and domestic uses include only drinking water, or does 
it also include sanitation, the most important way to prevent 
                                                                                                     
 255. See Feldman, supra note 254, at 7 (noting that ecologists see water 
subsidies as damaging to the environment). This focus on low-cost water 
demonstrates another inherent problem of any “human rights” approach to 
water policy, but particularly the positive human rights approach’s emphasis on 
cheap or free water—its inherent “humanness.” See Leonard Hammer, 
Indigenous Peoples as a Catalyst for Applying the Human Right to Water, 10 
INT’L J. MINORITY & GRP. RTS. 131, 135 (2004) (“Human needs branch out to 
many sectors of society, with each at times offsetting the other’s claims and 
diminishing the utility of the right.”). The human right to water as 
contemplated by General Comment 15 “seems to adopt an anthropocentric 
model, whereby the environment exists to serve the basic needs of human 
beings.” Id. at 134.  
 256. See T.C. DOUGHERTY & A.W. HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
OF IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE PROJECTS 47, 48 (1995) (explaining that irrigation 
systems will make the land wetter and less able to absorb rainfall, potentially 
leading to more soil erosion and resulting in an increase in the amount of 
sediments and salinity in the local rivers). 
 257. See Sharad K. Jain, Anupma Sharma, & Rakesh Kumar, Freshwater 
and Its Management in India, 2 INT’L J. RIVER BASIN MGMT. 259, 263–64 (2004) 
(explaining that large-scale extraction of groundwater in India has led to 
overdraft and a fall in the water table); J.M. Sharp, Jr., J.N. Krothe, J.D. 
Mather, B. Garcia-Fresca, & C.A. Steward, Effects of Urbanization on 
Groundwater Systems, in EARTH SCIENCE IN THE CITY: A READER 262–63 (Grant 
Heiken et al. eds., 2003) (explaining that due to the increased pumping, an 
aquifer in Texas is no longer able to maintain two major springs that are needed 
to “ensure the survival of several species of flora and fauna that only exist” in 
that area).  
 258. See generally General Comment 15, supra note 26. 
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water-borne or water-related disease?259 If so, infrastructure for 
the proper disposal, treatment, and recycling of wastewater can 
be even more costly than drinking-water infrastructure, raising 
even greater concerns for cost recovery and the environment.260 
The requirement to comply with the minimum core of a provision 
right to water requires investment in costly infrastructure like 
dams to ensure consistent delivery and emergency storage.261 And 
such infrastructure can have serious environmental consequences 
in terms of habitat loss and the promotion and breeding of 
disease vectors closer to human habitation.262 The lack of full cost 
recovery often associated with the provision right approach may 
preclude expansion and maintenance of infrastructure, leading 
greater numbers of poor people to pay higher prices for lower 
quality water from water vendors.263  
                                                                                                     
 259. See generally Annette Prüss, David Kay, Lorna Fewtrell & Jamie 
Bartram, Estimating the Burden of Disease from Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene 
at a Global Level, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 537 (2002). 
 260. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 39 (stating that wastewater 
services normally cost more per unit than providing freshwater); GUY HUTTON & 
LAURENCE HALLER, EVALUATION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF WATER AND 
SANITATION IMPROVEMENTS AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL 39 (2004) (noting that the costs 
in a cost-benefit analysis for water and sanitation interventions are often very 
tangible, while benefits are not because they may not be financial in nature). 
 261. See WILLIAM JOBIN, DAMS AND DISEASE: ECOLOGICAL DESIGN AND HEALTH 
IMPACTS OF LARGE DAMS, CANALS AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS 3 (1999) (stating that 
increasing populations and rising water consumption will require the use of 
dams to create greater water reserves). 
 262. See id. at 21, 29 (noting that dam and canal construction leads to loss of 
habitat through deforestation and creates breeding grounds for disease bearing 
insects close to human habitation). See generally Jennifer Keiser et al., Effect of 
Irrigation and Large Dams on the Burden of Malaria on a Global and Regional 
Scale, 72 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 392 (2005) (discussing the impact of 
dams and irrigation systems on the prevalence of malaria in nearby human 
habitation). 
 263. See ROUSE, supra note 71, at 47 (stating that general water subsidies 
are usually insufficient and unavailable for service expansion and maintenance 
into poor areas, forcing the poor in the developing world to pay water vendors up 
to twenty-five times more per liter of water than those paying for subsidized 
water); Marianne Kjellén & Gordon McGranahan, Informal Water Vendors and 
the Urban Poor, in HUMAN SETTLEMENTS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 12, 16, 17 
(2006), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10529IIED.pdf (explaining that it is well 
established that the urban poor are more likely to be excluded from piped water 
services and therefore may have to pay water vendors, who supply unsafe water, 
for their water needs). 
2234 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2013) 
Additionally, to the extent a provision right to water requires 
particular universally applied water quality standards, such a 
right may also be damaging to human health. Universally applied 
water quality standards can produce negative public health 
results. For example, disinfectant byproducts (DBPs) are 
compounds that result from the reaction of disinfectants (like 
chlorine) with organic compounds in water.264 Chronic ingestion 
of elevated concentrations of DBPs has been associated with 
cancer risk.265 Developed countries have the resources to 
concentrate on improving chronic standards of DBPs. Where 
chronic DBP standards are applied in developing countries, these 
countries tend to focus on compliance with DBP standards by 
reducing disinfectant levels.266 The threat posed in these 
countries by microbial pathogens that would be removed by 
increased disinfectant use is far greater than the threat of chronic 
carcinogenic DBP concentrations.267 If the provision right to 
water requires water of equal quality everywhere, such a right 
may ignore localized conditions to the detriment of public 
health.268 
                                                                                                     
 264. COMM. TO REVIEW THE NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED MGMT. STRATEGY, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FOR POTABLE WATER 
SUPPLY 103 (2000). 
 265. See id. at 104 (showing that the Environmental Protection Agency 
believes the overall weight of evidence supports a hazard concern with DBPs in 
the water supply); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 296 n.132 (2000) (noting the potential health 
problems with disinfectant byproducts and the approaches to addressing them).  
 266. See Nicholas John Ashbolt, Risk Analysis of Drinking Water Microbial 
Contamination Versus Disinfection By-Products (DBPs), 198 TOXICOLOGY 255, 
258 (2009) (noting that while environmental factors are important, “it is 
generally agreed that DBPs hazards may cause cancers”). 
 267. See id. at 260 (“[E]fforts to reduce potential health risks from DBP 
must not compromise pathogen control, despite socio-political issues.”). The 
World Health Organization has cautioned against universal, one-size-fits-all 
quality standards, noting that it “must be emphasized that the guideline values 
recommend [by the WHO] are not mandatory limits. In order to define such 
limits, it is necessary to consider the guideline values in the context of local or 
national environmental, social, economic, and cultural conditions.” Ashok 
Gadgil, Drinking Water in Developing Countries, 23 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 
253, 255 (1998) (quoting WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR 
DRINKING-WATER QUALITY VOLUME 2: HEALTH CRITERIA AND OTHER SUPPORTING 
INFORMATION (2nd ed. 1996), http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/ 
dwq/2edvol2p1.pdf).  
 268. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR DRINKING-WATER 
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Attempts to formulate a provision right to water invariably 
involve prioritization of water uses because of limited resources. 
However, prioritization requires an integrated approach, 
understanding the implications of expanding water 
infrastructure for environmental and public health. The 
anthropocentric focus on low- or no-cost water services of the 
provision right to water raises serious concerns as to its ecologic 
sustainability.269 Where the provision right runs counter to the 
objective of IWRM because of its narrow focus on drinking water 
and its failure to integrate ecological considerations, the provision 
right to water may prove damaging to human health and the 
environment.270 As noted above, in addition to interfering with 
effective IWRM, large general subsidies in the water sector have 
potentially harmful implications for the poor and actually could 
frustrate efforts to provide affordable water services. Thus, any 
ecological damage caused by general public water subsidies is not 
necessarily outweighed by expanded access and affordability 
achieved through such an approach. 
The provision right to water often fails to satisfy the 
justifications for a rights-based approach—equity, priority, and 
accountability. Because provision rights are often effectively 
unenforceable,271 water may not be given high priority by 
                                                                                                     
QUALITY VOLUME 2: HEALTH CRITERIA AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
(2nd ed. 1996), http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/2edvol2p1.pdf 
(“[T]he adoption of drinking-water standards that are too stringent could limit 
the availability of water supplies that meets those standards—a significant 
consideration in regions of water shortage.”). 
 269. See Hammer, supra note 255, at 134–35 (explaining that a state 
requirement to provide quality water to its people could conflict with 
environmental preservation goals such as the preservation of water). The 
human right to water as contemplated by General Comment 15 “seems to adopt 
an anthropocentric model, whereby the environment exists to serve the basic 
needs of human beings.” Id. at 134.  
 270. See Thompson, supra note 243, at 206, 208 (discussing how the lack of 
water-management integration can have a negative impact on the environment 
and on the quality of the water supply); United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Agenda 
21, ¶ 18.6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. II) (Aug. 12, 1992) (“The 
fragmentation of responsibilities for water resources development among 
sectoral agencies is proving . . . to be an even greater impediment to promoting 
integrated water management than had been anticipated.”). 
 271. See Cross, supra note 11, at 901 (“Because of the economics of rights 
enforcement and the strategic concerns of the judiciary, judges are likely to do 
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policymakers, and governments may not be held accountable for 
their failure to deliver sufficient quality water. As already noted 
in this section, large general subsidies based on a provision right 
to water often result in greater inequities in terms of water 
provision for the poor, and sustainability issues raise concerns of 
intergenerational equity. Ultimately, provision rights must be 
evaluated for their pragmatic utility.272 Without such a utilitarian 
approach, “provision rights are grounded in nothing more than an 
altruistic desire to take a symbolic action without regard for the 
interests of the very beneficiaries they purport to benefit” and 
reflect only “the conscience of the more privileged.”273 
IV. Toward a Participation Right in Water 
The provision rights approach to water policy raises potential 
problems associated with enforcement, economic and ecologic 
sustainability, and public health. This approach often fails to 
achieve the aims of a rights framework, including appropriately 
prioritizing water, holding governments accountable for water 
management, and promoting equitable water policies.274 Indeed, 
recent empirical studies comparing nations with provision rights 
to water to similar nations without such rights have found that a 
provision right to water does little, if anything, to advance 
equitable water provision.275 These potential problems are often 
associated with lack of resources and effective governance 
institutions in developing countries facing water scarcity and 
pollution.276 Nevertheless, despite the potential problems 
                                                                                                     
very little to promote the ends commanded by [positive] rights.”). 
 272. See id. at 878–80 (explaining why the rejection of pragmatism in the 
evaluation of positive rights is flawed).  
 273. Id.; see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE 
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973 143 (1993) (noting that litigation 
strategies are not the best way to combat poverty because the lawyers often 
have only second-hand knowledge of the issues). 
 274. See Cross, supra note 11, at 924–25 (concluding that judges will do 
little to enforce positive rights even if formally recognized as constitutional).  
 275. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 6 (asserting that empirical evidence 
shows that a constitutional right to water does not produce access to water). 
 276. See id. at 6–7 (noting that a reason why a right to water does not lead 
to water access is because supplying water requires a functioning government). 
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associated with the provision rights framework, a right to water 
may still advance sustainable and equitable water policies.  
An alternative approach, aimed at achieving appropriate 
prioritization of water, equitable water policies, and 
accountability in water management while avoiding problems of 
enforceability and sustainability, is a participation right in water. 
A participation right in water, unlike a provision right, would be 
immediately binding and enforceable and would not require 
courts to make technical determinations regarding the minimum 
core substance of the right.277 Additionally, because participation 
rights are largely procedural or involve government forbearance 
rather than an affirmative obligation to expend resources (at 
least not at the level of capital-intensive water infrastructure), 
participation rights claims do not raise the same issues of 
economic and ecologic sustainability as provision rights.278 
Enforcement of participation rights encourages good water 
governance, which will lead to improved water provision. 
The recent decision in Botswana, Matsipane Mosetlhanyane 
v. Attorney General,279 illustrates the potential of a rights-based 
approach aimed at governance and enforcement of existing civil 
and political rights as an alternative to a provision right to 
water.280 The Court of Appeals of Botswana noted that the 
Matsipane case is “a harrowing story of human suffering and 
despair caused by a shortage of water in the harsh climatic 
conditions of the Kalahari Desert where the appellants and their 
Basarwa community live.”281 Matsipane was a member of the 
Basarwa community that lived in the Central Kalahari Game 
                                                                                                     
 277. See Cross, supra note 11, at 901 (noting that positive rights tend to be 
vague and indeterminate, forcing judges to make rulings based on contested 
values); Zetland, supra note 32, at 9 (“Property rights strengthen the incentive 
to enforce legal or cultural standards of clean water.”).  
 278. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 11 (stating that privatization of water 
delivery leads to better water quality and more efficient water delivery systems 
because of more competition). 
 279. Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, ¶ 20 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), 
http://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-
jan-2011.pdf. 
 280. See id. ¶ 1 (concerning whether the residents of the Central Kalahari 
Game Reserve have the ability to recommission a borehole at their own expense 
for access to water). 
 281. Id. ¶ 4. 
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Reserve (CKGR), a national park in Botswana. The government 
of Botswana changed its policy with respect to the Basarwa 
community’s presence in the park after the Basarwa lived within 
the CKGR for years.282 As part of an alleged attempt to remove 
the Basarwa from the park, in 2002 the government 
decommissioned wells that it had previously maintained and that 
the community used as its sole source of water.283 The 
decommissioning of the wells resulted in serious health 
complications for members of the Basarwa community.284 Unlike 
in South Africa, there is no provision right to water under the 
Constitution of Botswana.  
The Basarwa community, however, was able to use a 
participation right guaranteed under the Constitution of 
Botswana to secure access to water resources.285 The right relied 
upon by the Basarwa community, and upheld by the appellate 
court, is set forth in Section 7(1) of the Constitution of Botswana, 
which provides that “[n]o person shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment.”286  
Unlike South Africa’s Constitutional Court decision in 
Mazibuko,287 which pointed out that the constitutional guarantee 
                                                                                                     
 282. Id. ¶¶ 4–7. At the time the CKGR was established, it was expressly 
stated that the Basarwa could maintain their nomadic presence in the CKGR. 
Id. ¶¶ 4–5. Over the years, however, the Basarwa had established permanent 
settlements in the CKGR. Id. ¶ 4. The government of Botswana determined that 
permanent settlements were not compatible with the ecological conservation 
purposes of the CKGR and that the Basarwa community should be relocated. Id.  
 283. Id. ¶ 8. In 1986, the De Beers Company agreed that a prospecting 
borehole installed by the company within the CKGR could be used by the 
Basarwa community as a well for domestic water use. Id. ¶ 5. The Ghanzi 
District Council, a municipal governmental entity, maintained the well pump on 
the borehole and provided fuel for the pump engine. Id. ¶ 6. 
 284. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. 
 285. The trial court in Matsipane denied the Basarwa community’s claim of 
access to the borehole in part because the court interpreted water law in 
Botswana to require an administratively issued water right in order to 
withdraw groundwater. Id. ¶ 13. The Basarwa had no such administratively 
issued water right in connection with its withdrawals from the De Beers 
borehole. Id. ¶ 5. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision 
regarding the requirement of a water right, holding that “any person who 
lawfully occupies or owns land has a right to sink a borehole on such land for 
domestic purposes without a water right.” Id. ¶ 16. 
 286. Id. ¶ 19 (citing CONST. Sept. 30, 1966, ch. II, § 7(1) (Bots.)). 
 287. Supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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at issue was conditioned on “progressive realization,” the 
appellate court in Botswana noted that the constitutional 
guarantee at issue in Matsipane is “absolute and unqualified.”288 
The appellate court concluded, given how the community suffered 
from lack of water, that denial of access to the borehole 
constituted a violation of the Basarwa’s constitutionally 
guaranteed right to be free from degrading treatment.289 The 
wells were recommissioned and maintained by the government, 
with the Basarwa paying tariffs for maintenance of the wells.290 
The court’s decision immediately secured water resources for the 
Basarwa without being limited by available resources or 
requiring the court to make a technical determination of a 
minimum core, and the decision did not require an unsustainable 
approach to water provision.291 
The next subpart proposes an alternative approach to the 
right to water, framing the right to water as a participation right. 
Subpart A proposes and evaluates a participation right in water, 
and argues that such a right can be immediately and effectively 
implemented in many countries if based on the public trust 
doctrine. Subpart B considers the limitations of a participation 
right in water generally and a participation right in water based 
on the public trust doctrine specifically. Finally, subpart C 
discusses how assertion of a participation right in water, despite 
not guaranteeing a minimum core of quality or quantity, would 
ultimately promote the development and implementation of 
sustainable and equitable water policies essential for the 
provision of a minimum core of water quality and supply for all. 
A. A Participation Right in Water and the Public Trust Doctrine 
The Matsipane case illustrates how claims based on 
participation rights can facilitate water access for disadvantaged 
people while avoiding issues of sustainability and 
                                                                                                     
 288. Matsipane Mosetlhanyane v. Attorney Gen., Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-
10, ¶ 19 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), http://www.escr-net.org/sites/ 
default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf. 
 289. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.  
 290. Id. ¶ 25.  
 291. Id.  
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enforceability.292 In Matsipane, the Basarwa successfully secured 
access and control over water resources and compelled the 
government to restore and maintain water infrastructure by 
relying on an enforceable participation right that did not require 
the court to engage in technical determinations of water 
management for which it was ill-suited.293  
Such participation rights claims could be framed in several 
ways. First, where water services are provided, denied, or 
withdrawn because of government discrimination on the basis of 
gender, ethnicity, race, or religion, such water policy would 
violate broadly accepted participation rights to equal 
protection.294 For example, the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
commented on Israel’s approach to water provision in Palestinian 
territories, arguing that denial of water could constitute a 
violation of the right to equal protection under the law.295 
                                                                                                     
 292. Id. (“[D]ecision reflects broader protection of indigenous peoples on land 
marked as game preserves.”).  
 293. Id. ¶ 16 (concluding that Basarwa do not require a water right for the 
use of the borehole). Scholars of the human right to food have recently argued in 
favor of focusing on supply side solutions to hunger, arguing that in lieu of food 
programs, more should be done with “expanding social and political rights” as 
more effective in combating hunger. J. Craig Jenkins, Stephen J. Scanlan & 
Lindsey Peterson, Military Famine, Human Rights, and Child Hunger: A Cross-
National Analysis, 1990–2000, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 823, 823 (2007). States 
that protect civil rights experience three times the rate of economic growth of 
states that fail to protect those rights, creating a resource pool from which a 
state can provide primary goods for citizen interests. Gerald W. Scully, The 
Institutional Framework and Economic Development, 96 J. POL. ECON. 652, 661 
(1988).  
 294. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Rise of Equality in International Law and 
Its Pitfalls: Learning from Comparative Constitutional Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 3 (2010) (“The principle of nondiscrimination prohibits any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction, or preference that is based on any grounds, such as race, 
color, or other identifiable individual or group distinctions.”). 
 295. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Israel, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3 (Sept. 3, 
2010), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/448/06/PDF/G10448 
06.pdf (“The Committee is concerned at water shortages disproportionately 
affecting the Palestinian population of the West Bank . . . . The State party 
should ensure that all residents of the West Bank have equal access to water, in 
accordance with the World Health Organization quality and quantity 
standards.”); McGraw, supra note 98, at 147 (noting that the Human Rights 
Committee first recognized the denial of water as a violation of the right to 
equal protection under the law in its 2010 report). 
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Importantly, the only two instances where a right to water is 
referenced explicitly in binding international law treaties are in 
the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)296 and the Convention 
on the Rights of Children (CRC),297 two conventions directed at 
protecting classes of people against discrimination. 
Second, in some circumstances, communities could assert 
that government water policy constitutes a violation of the 
broadly accepted right to religious liberty.298 For example, for 
certain communities, rivers have religious significance.299 Where 
government policy relating to water abstractions or water quality 
in that river interferes with religious worship, such communities 
could allege that government action violates guarantees of 
religious freedom.300  
                                                                                                     
 296. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180, at 196 (Dec. 18, 1979) 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/378/07/IMG/NR037807 
.pdf [hereinafter CEDAW] (“State Parties . . . shall ensure to such women the 
right . . . [t]o enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to 
housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and 
communications.”). 
 297. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/25, at 169–70 (Nov. 20, 1989) http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/ 
44/a44r025.htm [hereinafter CRC] (“State Parties shall pursue full 
implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take appropriate 
measures . . . [t]o combat disease and malnutrition, including within the 
framework of primary health care, through, inter alia . . . the provision of 
adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water . . . .”). 
 298. See Johan D. van der Vyver, Limitations of Freedom of Religion or 
Belief: International Law Perspectives, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 503–12 
(2005) (describing international conventions that protect the freedom of 
religion).  
 299. See, e.g., Diana L. Eck, Ganga: The Goddess Ganges in Hindu Sacred 
Geography, in DEVI: GODDESS OF INDIA 137, 137 (John S. Hawley & Donna M. 
Wulff eds., 1996) (“Along her entire length the Ganga is sacred, and just as a 
temple or a holy city might be circumambulated, so is the entire river 
circumambulated . . . .”); Kheryn Klubnikin et al., The Sacred and the Scientific: 
Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Siberian River Conservation, 10 
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1296, 1304–05 (2000) (describing the cultural and 
religious significance of the Katun River to indigenous groups in the Altai 
Mountain region of Siberia). 
 300. See, e.g., U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. 
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, at 7 (Sept. 13, 2007) http://www.un.org/ 
esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf [hereinafter IP Declaration] 
(“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive 
spiritual relationships with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and 
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Third, governmental policy interfering with or appropriating 
property rights without just compensation or due process 
constitutes an unlawful exercise of eminent domain authority and 
a violation of a broadly accepted participation right recognized 
under international law.301 Where individuals or communities 
have secured a property interest in water and the government 
unjustly or arbitrarily interferes with that interest, such 
interference could constitute a participation rights violation.302 
For example, where an irrigation district had a government-
issued right to use water in California, the California 
government’s regulations protecting certain endangered species 
that limited that water right violated citizens’ participation 
rights to be free from unjust and arbitrary exercises of eminent 
domain.303 
These types of claims, as well as the participation rights 
claim in Matsipane based on a right to be free from inhumane 
treatment,304 have certain potential advantages over a provision 
                                                                                                     
used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources . . . .”); 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1108 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(Fletcher, J. dissenting) (arguing that the use of recycled wastewater that 
contains 0.0001% human waste in the artificial snowmaking process on 
federally owned public land that has religious and cultural significance to 
southwestern Indian tribes violates the tribes’ free exercise of religion); see also 
supra Part II.C (providing examples of international and domestic provisions 
that either explicitly or implicitly grant a legal right to water access).  
 301. See, e.g., CP Covenant, supra note 15, at 53 (“All people may . . . freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence.”). See generally Michael G. Parisi, 
Moving Toward Transparency? An Examination of Regulatory Takings in 
International Law, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 383 (2005).   
 302. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
 303. See generally Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 
49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001); see also Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 
F.3d 1276, 1288–97 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (analyzing the government’s diversion of 
canal water for the purpose of protecting an endangered fish species under the 
physical taking paradigm). 
 304. Matsipane Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen., Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, 
¶ 20 (Civ. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), http://www.escr-net.org/sites/ 
default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf (“It was submitted 
on the appellants’ behalf that the Government’s refusal to allow them 
permission to use, at their own expense, the [well] . . . for domestic purposes 
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rights approach. The right at issue is immediately binding and 
not conditioned on available resources. Unlike provision rights, 
enforcement of a participation right does not require the court to 
make technical determinations regarding a minimum core, but 
rather tells the government it must either cease a particular 
action or return what it has taken.305 Additionally, because these 
rights demand government forbearance, participation rights do 
not implicate the same concerns for economic sustainability as an 
affirmative duty to provide a certain amount and quality of water 
under a provision right.306 
Under international law, the advantages of a participation 
rights approach are even more pronounced. Participation rights 
guaranteed under the CP Covenant are jurisprudentially mature 
and allow for claims to be brought by non-state actors under a 
binding Optional Protocol,307 unlike provision rights enumerated 
in the ESC Covenant.308 The central concern for advocates of a 
                                                                                                     
amounts to degrading treatment . . . .”). 
 305. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 324 (requiring the 
government to pay for the water that was taken for public use).  
 306. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 4 (“Positive rights are hard to define and 
costly to provide . . . . We cannot tell when action, of a certain quality, quantity 
or price, is enough. It costs nothing to supply an increased demand for negative 
rights, but the cost of positive rights grows with demand (e.g., population).”). 
 307. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI), at 59 (Dec. 16, 
1966), http://www.un-documents.net/a21r2200.htm (“A State Party to the 
Covenant that becomes a party to the present Protocol recognizes the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from 
individuals . . . who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any 
of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”); JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 206, at 105 
(explaining the domestic remedies that a complainant must exhaust before 
seeking redress internationally through the CP Covenant). Similar claims based 
on civil rights guaranteeing equal protection and religious freedom could also be 
asserted under the CP Covenant. See CP Covenant, supra note 15, at 54 (“All 
persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.”); id. at 55 (“Everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”). 
 308. See Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints 
Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 462 (2004) (“Ever since the adoption of the [ESC 
Covenant] . . . proponents of economic, social, and cultural rights have 
complained that the [ESC Covenant] lacks oversight and implementation 
mechanisms equal to those provided in the [CP Covenant] and its first Optional 
Protocol.”). But see Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. 
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right to water under international law is arguably to give effect to 
the central reason for such a right—which is to provide legal 
leverage for disenfranchised or economically disadvantaged 
peoples to influence the development of water policy. No such 
leverage exists under international law without an adjudicative 
process and a binding Optional Protocol.309 
However, there are obvious limitations to these types of 
participation rights claims. In Matsipane, in particular, the right 
at issue is a broad and rather uniquely formulated right.310 The 
situation in Matsipane is so peculiarly well-suited to a successful 
claim under such a unique right as to provide little guidance on 
what a participation right in water would look like in other 
countries and under more common circumstances.311 Still, a 
participation rights approach, like those more general claims 
discussed above,312 remains problematic for more broadly 
applicable reasons.  
First, such claims do not, in and of themselves, constitute a 
participation right in water. Rather, the issue of water is 
incidental to the violation of some other participation right.313 
                                                                                                     
A/RES/63/117, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2008) (“Communications may be submitted by or on 
behalf of individuals or groups of individuals, under the jurisdiction of a State 
Party, claiming to be victims of a violation of any of the economic, social and 
cultural rights set forth in the Covenant by that State Party.”). 
 309. See Dennis & Stewart, supra note 308, at 463 (“[S]tate compliance with 
economic, social, and cultural rights must be ‘justiciable’—subject to the 
possibility of formal third-party adjudication, with remedies for findings of 
noncompliance.”). 
 310. See Matsipane Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen., Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-
10, ¶ 25 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), http://www.escr-net.org/sites/ 
default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf (asserting both that 
the appellants had an inherent right to access water by reopening an existing 
well and that the government refrain from preventing the exercising of that 
right). 
 311. Nevertheless, under Part III, Article 7 of the CP Covenant, “[n]o one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” CP Covenant, supra note 15, at 53. The Basarwa community’s 
claim that the government violated its negative right to be free from torture or 
inhuman punishment or treatment could be asserted in an international 
tribunal. See Matsipane, Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, ¶ 19 (discussing the 
right to be free from torture or inhuman punishment).  
 312. Supra Part IV. 
 313. See, e.g., CP Covenant, supra note 15, at 53 (prohibiting torture and 
inhuman and cruel treatment or punishment, but never specifically mentioning 
access to water). 
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Second, these claims assume both access to water and that the 
state is simply discriminating in its provision or management.314 
These assumptions may not apply in many cases, particularly in 
developing countries, and do not necessarily provide more or 
better water to those in need of improved quantity and quality. 
Such an assumption is particularly problematic with regards to 
claims of an unlawful exercise of eminent domain, because the 
assumption is that the aggrieved party has existing entitlements 
or property rights.315 Those most in need of a right to water are 
also those least likely to have such entitlements and property 
protected by participation rights. Third, reallocating water on the 
basis of these types of claims may not necessarily be more 
equitable. Claims of discrimination or infringement on religious 
liberties could result in inequitable allocations of water.  
The challenge, therefore, is how to formulate a participation 
right in water—one that is sustainable, immediately enforceable, 
jurisprudentially mature, and avoids compelling courts to make 
technical determinations for which they are ill-suited. At the 
same time, such a participation right must be broadly applicable 
and grounded on widely accepted legal doctrines directly 
applicable to water apportionment and quality. Furthermore, a 
participation right in water must satisfy the three justifications 
for applying a rights framework to water policy—equity, priority, 
and accountability. While a participation right in water can be 
grounded on existing civil or political rights (as seen in 
Matsipane)316 or expressly incorporated into national 
constitutions, the public trust doctrine provides the foundation 
for a participation right in water meeting these criteria that can 
be broadly and immediately implemented in many parts of the 
world. 
The “public trust doctrine” is a common legal doctrine with 
roots in Roman and British law recognized in many countries, 
                                                                                                     
 314. See, e.g., Matsipane, Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, ¶¶ 1–9 (establishing 
the Basarwa community’s right to recommission a previously existing well). 
 315. See JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (3d ed. 1909) (“Eminent domain is the right or power of a 
sovereign State to appropriate private property to particular uses, for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare.” (emphasis added)).  
 316. See Matsipane, Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-10, ¶¶ 1–9 (establishing the 
Basarwa community’s right to recommission a previously existing well). 
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whereby water is seen as being held in trust by the government 
for the benefit of all citizens.317 As noted above, while the public 
trust doctrine is interpreted and applied differently through the 
world, it is widely recognized legal doctrine in many parts of 
Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Europe.318 Furthermore, the 
public trust doctrine is increasingly recognized as binding 
customary international law and a canon of interpretation of 
international environmental law.319 
Citizens thus do not own water under the public trust 
doctrine.320 Instead, they hold usufructuary rights rather than 
exclusive-possessory ownership.321 That right to use water held in 
trust by the state is subject to conditions imposed by the state 
trustee, typically the requirement that any use be “reasonable 
and beneficial.”322 Thus, the government owns water in trust for 
                                                                                                     
 317. See Sax, supra note 51, at 475 (describing the historical background of 
the public trust doctrine). 
 318. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 760–808 (finding applications 
of the public trust doctrine in many countries, including India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Ecuador, and 
Canada).  
 319. See id. at 748 (“Somewhat surprisingly, the public trust doctrine has 
become institutionalized and, in the process, moved to the forefront of 
environmental protection in several countries.”); Edith Brown Weiss, 
Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global Environmental Change, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 398 (Edith Brown 
Weiss ed., 1992) (“The theory of intergenerational equity has a deep basis in 
international law.”); William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an 
Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 693, 714–19 (2012) (arguing that 
courts rely on the public trust doctrine as a cannon of interpretation even when 
ruling on non-aquatic resources); Thompson, supra note 9, at 35 (noting that the 
public trust doctrine could be used in connection with customary international 
law to establish a human right to water); Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, 
Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 696 (2008) (“A strong 
parallel to the public trust doctrine can be seen in international law, where 
various conventions and declarations identify water as a basic human right, 
either on its own or as a necessary incident of other human rights.”). 
 320. See Saxer, supra note 230, at 50 (“Water is a crucial public resource, 
and its fluid nature requires that the government limit private rights to the 
‘right to use’ water that ultimately belongs to the public and is held in trust for 
us by the government.”). 
 321. See id. (“By expanding the public trust doctrine to support a public 
stewardship model, the management and allocation of this unique common 
resource will be entrusted to the government for the public good.”). 
 322. See id. at 64–69 (describing the state’s resource management 
obligations under the public trust doctrine); Michael C. Blumm & Thea 
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all citizens but recognizes the rights of individual citizens to use 
water so long as that use is beneficial (in other words, is not 
wasteful) and reasonable (in other words, does not impair the 
beneficial use of another right-holder). The public trust doctrine 
is both a negative limitation on private property interests in 
water and an affirmative obligation of the government to protect 
water resources held in trust for all.323  
The dual nature of the public trust doctrine provides the 
basis of a participation right in water. The interests all citizens 
have as beneficiaries of the public trust constitute a property 
interest in water resources.324 Essentially, the interest held by 
the citizens in public trust property begins at the negative 
limitation on the usufructuary water rights of individuals—
citizens have a right to ensure that property held in trust is used 
both reasonably and beneficially.325 Where government action 
impairs or interferes with that trust interest (in other words, 
water is used unreasonably or not beneficially), individual 
citizens’ participation rights to be free from unjust or arbitrary 
exercises of eminent domain are violated.326 Where the 
government breaches its obligation to manage water held in the 
                                                                                                     
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 701, 722 (1995) (“The union of the appropriation system and the public 
trust doctrine meant that the property right in water was correlative, . . . water 
diverters have no right to a fixed quantity of water, only a reasonable beneficial 
use that accommodates trust uses where feasible.”). 
 323. See John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background 
Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 950–54 
(2012) (identifying four definitions for the public trust doctrine, including a duty 
to manage resources for the public’s benefit and a limitation on private 
ownership of trust resources). Where government actions have interfered with 
these usufructuary water rights, there has been a debate as to whether such 
interference constitutes an exercise of eminent domain. See generally LEWIS, 
supra note 315. This debate is outside the scope of this Article.  
 324. See Sax, supra note 51, at 478 (“The most common theory advanced in 
support of a special trust obligation is a property notion . . . .”). 
 325. See id. at 485 (“[O]ne does not own a property right in water in the 
same way he owns his watch or his shoes, but . . . he owns only an usufruct—an 
interest that incorporates the need of others.”). 
 326. See Saxer, supra note 230, at 55 (“If we deem water to be a property 
right, government restrictions on the right to use water may result in a finding 
that water users must be justly compensated under the Takings Clause and 
may also generate due process or equal protection claims.”). 
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public trust, that breach violates citizens’ participation right in 
water.  
The participation right in water under the public trust 
doctrine is both procedural and substantive. However, it does not 
require the state to affirmatively provide water to anyone—only 
to ensure that it meets due process requirements in water 
resource management and complies with the requirements to 
manage public trust property in accordance with the principles of 
reasonable and beneficial use.327 Where the state infringes upon 
the interests of its citizens in public trust property by failing to 
manage water in accordance with the principles of reasonable 
and beneficial use, water rights allocations and discharge 
authorizations may be revoked or suspended pending review. The 
public trust doctrine has been applied in many jurisdictions 
internationally, with broad implications for the state’s authority 
to condition water abstraction, use, and discharge permits, as 
well as water service concession contracts.328 State water 
management decisions, including authorizations of discharges, 
allocations of water rights, and concession contracts for 
ownership or operation of water infrastructure, should comply 
with principles of due process, including adequate public notice, 
transparency, and stakeholder participation. Water policy 
decisions taken inconsistent with these due process requirements 
would be void pending remediation of the procedural defect.329 
South Africa and Mazibuko provide excellent context to 
understand how the participation right in water based on the 
public trust doctrine would operate in practice.330 The public trust 
doctrine is enshrined in South Africa’s National Water Act331 and 
                                                                                                     
 327. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 319, at 691–99 (describing the nature 
of water rights under the public trust doctrine). 
 328. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, at 760–808 (finding developed 
public trust doctrines in at least ten countries).  
 329. See Saxer, supra note 230, at 104 (“In addition to a takings claim, 
litigants seeking a remedy from the government for interference with their 
water rights may assert claims that the government action has deprived them of 
due process (procedural and/or substantive) and/or equal protection.”). 
 330. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 23–34 
paras. 46–68 (S. Afr.) (defining the obligations imposed upon the state by a 
constitution that grants the right of access to sufficient water). 
 331. See National Water Act 36 of 1998 § 3(1) (S. Afr.) (“As the public trustee 
of the nation’s water resources the National Government, acting through the 
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the National Environmental Management Act.332 Instead of 
pursuing a provision rights claim, Mazibuko and the residents of 
Phiri could have claimed that the prepaid water program 
deprived them of their property interest, held as beneficiaries of 
the public trust, without due process. Additionally, Mazibuko and 
the residents of Phiri could allege that Johannesburg failed to 
manage water resources consistent with the principles of 
reasonable and beneficial use by establishing an inadequate 
water provision system that failed to account for household size, 
consumption patterns, and ability to pay. The remedy would have 
been suspension of the prepaid free basic water program pending 
an improved process involving stakeholders from Phiri and the 
establishment of a record justifying the city’s ultimate 
approach.333 A similar approach could be taken in other countries 
mentioned above where the public trust doctrine is a recognized 
feature of their jurisprudence and where they face challenges in 
developing equitable water policies, including India, the United 
States, Bolivia, and Botswana.334 This approach may also be 
viable as the public trust doctrine achieves increasing recognition 
as customary international law in international tribunals.335 
A participation right in water, like a provision right, puts 
first things first. However, unlike a provision right, a 
                                                                                                     
Minister, must ensure that water is protected, used, developed, conserved, 
managed and controlled in a sustainable and equitable manner, for the benefit 
of all persons and in accordance with its constitutional mandate.”).  
 332. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 § 2(4)(o) (S. Afr.) 
(“The environment is held in public trust for the people, the beneficial use of 
environmental resources must serve the public interest and the environment 
must be protected as the people’s common heritage.”); see also Robyn Stein, 
Water Law in a Democratic South Africa: A Country Case Study Examining the 
Introduction of a Public Rights System, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2167, 2167 (2005) (“The 
public trust doctrine forms the cornerstone of the public rights system 
introduced by the National Water Act.”). 
 333. See supra Part III (describing the relevance of the Mazibuko case to the 
distinction between a provision right and a participation right). 
 334. See Blumm & Guthrie, supra note 17, for a description of the public 
trust doctrine in the United States, India, and around the world. 
 335. See David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human 
Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 734 (2008) 
(“As an emerging norm in customary international law that is codified in ever 
more numerous documents in more and more corners of the world, 
Environmental Human Rights have enormous potential to create new 
prohibitions on what a private property owner may do with her land.”). 
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participation right in water based on the public trust doctrine 
would be immediately enforceable and grounded on a broadly 
accepted legal doctrine commonly applied to water management. 
Additionally, such a right does not compel courts to make 
technical determinations for which they are ill-suited. Because a 
participation right in water would not necessarily require 
provision of a certain quantity or quality of water at a certain 
price, it does not raise the problems of sustainability associated 
with a provision right.336 Furthermore, a participation right in 
water based on the public trust doctrine would allow citizens to 
hold their governments accountable for mismanagement of water 
resources. Finally, the participation right in water empowers 
disadvantaged people to engage in the development of water 
policy, thereby promoting equitable provision of sufficient, 
affordable, and clean water. 
B. Evaluating the Limitations of the Participation Right in Water 
Despite its advantages over a provision right, the 
participation right in water is no panacea. A participation rights 
approach in water policy in general has several potential 
limitations, including the following: (1) participation rights are 
not adequately protected in those countries suffering most from 
water stress and many of these countries do not recognize the 
public trust doctrine or do so in ways not suitable to support a 
participation right in water; (2) disadvantaged people are no 
more likely to prevail under a participation rights approach than 
a provision rights approach in court; (3) the cost of asserting 
participation rights effectively precludes their use for 
disadvantaged peoples; (4) without a guaranteed minimum core, 
the participation rights approach raises concerns of inequitable 
water pricing; and (5) a participation rights approach is an 
iterative, ad hoc approach lacking the integrated, centralized 
character of a provision right to water. The participation right in 
water based on the public trust addresses some of these potential 
                                                                                                     
 336. For an example of the allocation complications of provision rights, see 
Mazibuko v. Johannesburg, 2010 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 6–9 paras. 10–18 (S. Afr.), 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/28.pdf (describing the inefficiency of 
water distribution in South Africa under a provision rights system). 
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limitations but features other limitations of its own as well. This 
subsection evaluates these potential limitations of a participation 
right in water generally, and the participation right to water 
based on the public trust specifically, concluding that despite the 
potential limitations, the participation right in water remains a 
promising avenue for addressing problems of inequity and 
sustainability in water policy. 
The first objection to a participation rights approach to water 
generally is that participation rights are not adequately protected 
in many countries, and perhaps most particularly in countries 
suffering from water stress and lacking the governance 
institutions necessary to address water stress. Instability, 
poverty, war, and corruption have prevented or slowed 
development of equitable and sustainable water policy in many 
parts of the world, with a lack of enforceable participation rights 
associated with such governance challenges partially attributable 
to failures in water policy in such countries.337 Indeed, 
government incompetence or corruption is often as much a cause 
of drought as the climate.338 Strengthening civil society, 
improving governance institutions, combating corruption through 
transparency, and protecting civil and political rights is essential 
for equitable and sustainable water resource management.339  
                                                                                                     
 337. See generally Gadgil, supra note 267. 
 338. See Nejat Anbarci et al., The Ill Effects of Public Sector Corruption in 
the Water and Sanitation Sector, 85 LAND ECON. 363, 366 (2009) (“That 
corruption is pervasive in the water and sanitation sector seems beyond 
dispute.”); Janelle Plummer, Water and Corruption: A Destructive Partnership, 
in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2008 3, 3–17, http://archive.transparency.org/ 
content/download/32766/502089 (arguing that corruption in water sectors 
exacerbates the water inaccessibility worldwide); Muhammad Sohail & Sue 
Cavill, Water for the Poor: Corruption in Water Supply and Sanitation, GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION REP., 2008, at 40, 41, http://archive.transparency.org/publications/ 
gcr/gcr_2008 (“More than any other group, the poor are the main victims of the 
global water crisis. . . . Corruption is a major force driving . . . the growing global 
water crisis.”). 
 339. See generally Emmanuelle Auriol & Aymeric Blanc, Capture and 
Corruption in Public Utilities: The Cases of Water and Electricity in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 17 UTIL. POL’Y 203 (2009). States that protect civil rights 
experience three times the rate of economic growth of states that fail to protect 
those rights, creating a resource pool from which a state can provide primary 
goods for citizen interests. Scully, supra note 293, at 661. 
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Additionally, the public trust doctrine, despite being accepted 
in many countries, is not recognized in all nations.340 Even where 
it is recognized, it may be applied in ways unsuitable to support a 
participation right in water.341 Successful implementation of the 
participation right in water based on the public trust doctrine 
will be limited, at least at first, to those countries with strong 
governance institutions, a public trust doctrine recognized and 
applied in ways facilitating a participation right in water, but 
facing water stress issues. More research will be needed on the 
suitability of particular states for this approach, but India and 
South Africa appear to meet the necessary criteria to successfully 
implement a participation right in water based on the public 
trust doctrine.342 
One potential avenue for addressing the challenge of the 
limited geographic scope of the participation right to water is 
through an appeal to international law. Supranational 
organizations teach national governments how to govern by 
means of developing and encouraging international discourse and 
norms, in a process called “constructivism.”343 The Optional 
Protocol to the CP Covenant allows nonstate actors to bring 
participation rights claims against their governments, thereby 
facilitating developing norms.344 As noted above, the public trust 
doctrine and the right to be free from arbitrary deprivations of 
                                                                                                     
 340. See generally Mary Turnipseed et al., Reinvigorating the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Expert Opinion on the Potential of a Public Trust Mandate in U.S. and 
International Environmental Law, 52 ENV’T 6 (2010). 
 341. See, e.g., id. at 11–12 (explaining that the lack of private or charitable 
trust equivalents in some contemporary European civil legal systems 
complicates the operation of public trusts in those systems). 
 342. See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388, 414–15 (India) 
(finding that a lease of public land approving blasting within a national park 
violated the public trust doctrine); Robyn Stein, South Africa’s New Democratic 
Water Legislation: National Government’s Role as Public Trustee in Dam 
Building and Management Activities, 18 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 284, 
284–95 (2000) (analyzing the South African government’s role as public trustee 
under the National Water Act 36 of 1998). 
 343. M.C. Mehta, 1 S.C.C. at 414–15. 
 344. See Optional Protocol to the CP Covenant, supra note 206, at 59 (“A 
State Party . . . recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and 
consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim 
to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in 
the Covenant.”). 
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property are both recognized under international law.345 As such, 
claims of violations of a participation right in water based on the 
public trust doctrine could facilitate discourse on equitable and 
sustainable water policy and encourage the development of such 
norms in national governments.  
A second objection to a participation rights approach in 
general is that disadvantaged people are perhaps no more likely 
to prevail under such an approach than under a provision rights 
approach. For example, the plaintiffs in Mazibuko asserted 
participation rights claims.346 They argued that the prepaid 
meters approach was unconstitutional because it was imposed in 
Phiri, and not in other areas of Johannesburg, based on racial 
discrimination.347 The lower courts each held in favor of the 
plaintiffs,348 but this holding was reversed by the Constitutional 
Court.349 The Constitutional Court held that the prepaid meters 
and “free basic water” approach were taken in Phiri because Phiri 
was the township with the greatest amount of nonrevenue water 
in Johannesburg, not because of race.350 The Constitutional 
Court, however, was arguably too quick to disentangle the 
challenge of cost recovery in Phiri from the township’s racial 
history. In any event, Mazibuko is as much an example of the 
limits of a participation rights approach as it is of the problems of 
provision rights. However, the complex relationship between 
discrimination of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and 
inequalities in resource allocation is a limitation inherent in the 
adjudication of any kind of right.351 
                                                                                                     
 345. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 319, at 696 (“A strong parallel to the 
public trust doctrine can be seen in international law, where various 
conventions and declarations identify water as a basic human right, either on its 
own or as a necessary incident of other human rights.”). 
 346. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 21–23 paras. 
44–45 (S. Afr.).  
 347. Id. at 78 para. 148. 
 348. Id. at 12–18 paras. 26–40. 
 349. See id. at 87 para. 169 (holding “neither the Free Basic Water policy 
nor the introduction of prepaid water meters in Phiri . . . constitute a breach of 
section 27 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the respondents’ appeals succeed 
and the order made by the Supreme Court of Appeal should be set aside”). 
 350. See id. at 78 para. 149 (discussing the Constitutional Court’s finding 
that the water system was implemented for economic and not racial purposes). 
 351. See Cross, supra note 11, at 881 (discussing the relative difficulties poor 
communities face when attempting to litigate rights). 
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On the other hand, Matsipane is arguably as much an 
example of the potential of a provision rights approach as it is of 
a participation rights approach. While the court in Matsipane 
ultimately held in favor of the Basarwa based on a participation 
right, the court bolstered its argument by relying on provision 
rights rhetoric.352 The court, in deciding in favor of the Basarwa, 
relied on the 2010 U.N. Resolution and General Comment 15 in 
support of their holding that the closure of the borehole violated 
the constitution of Botswana.353 As such, while the typical 
formulation of the provision right to water is problematic from a 
legal and sustainability perspective,354 it still has rhetorical and 
political value, as illustrated in Matsipane. 
Inequality is arguably an inevitable feature of any water 
policy in any nation with a history of discrimination, and 
participation rights claims will sometimes fail.355 Nevertheless, 
such facts do nothing to counter the advantage such an approach 
has over a provision rights approach in terms of enforceability 
and sustainability. Furthermore, the rhetorical and political 
value of a provision rights approach does not fully counteract the 
unsustainable practices often associated with that framework, 
nor does it fully ameliorate the jurisprudential immaturity of that 
approach.356 
A third limitation of a participation rights approach to water 
policy in general is that asserting such rights is costly, which 
limits the availability of rights-based claims to those who need 
them most.357 In his book on poverty and the law, Chris Smith 
                                                                                                     
 352. See Matsipane Mosetlhanyane v. Att’y Gen., Civ. App. No. CACLB-074-
10, ¶ 25 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011) (Bots.), http://www.escr-net.org/ 
sites/default/files/bushmen-water-appeal-judgement-jan-2011.pdf (stating “the 
correct interpretation of Section 6 is that an owner or occupier of land intending 
to sink or deepen any well or borehole thereon and abstract water therefrom for 
domestic purposes, may do so only in accordance with a water right granted 
under the Act”).  
 353. Id. at 37–39. 
 354. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 681 n.3 (describing 
inadequacy of legal mechanisms for obtaining access to water).  
 355. See id. at 689 (recognizing inherent discrimination against poor 
communities and women as noted by Judge Tsoka in Mazibuko). 
 356. See id. at 692–93 (describing the unsustainability of the Phiri water 
program, an example of the provision right approach, despite the high political 
and social goals the policy was intended to serve). 
 357. See Cross, supra note 11, at 881 (“Rights enforcement requires 
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concludes that “legal doctrine and court processes can 
significantly disadvantage poor people who seek to pursue 
claims.”358 The cost of litigation limits the effectiveness of rights 
enforcement regardless of whether the right is framed as a 
provision right or participation right.359 However, while much 
could potentially be done to reduce costs related to, or increase 
the availability of, adjudication of participation rights, the rights 
remain an important and comparatively effective avenue for the 
poor to protect their interests by legal means.360  
A fourth potential limitation of the participation rights 
approach in general is the risk of inequitable pricing. Under a 
provision rights approach, a legal guarantee of a minimum core of 
water with a maximum price set at an affordable level would, 
arguably, at least ensure water for all. Without such a guarantee, 
water pricing and cost recovery efforts, including privatization of 
water resources and infrastructure, could result in decreased 
access and increased costs for the poor.361 Privatization of water 
as a commodity obviously has challenges, as illustrated by the 
Bolivean government’s approach in Cochabamba.362 Nevertheless, 
as noted above, privatization is not the same thing as water 
pricing.363 Water pricing, regardless of the method, must take 
                                                                                                     
resources . . . . Poor individuals and, to a degree, groups representing the poor 
may lack the resources to advance effectively the right.”). 
 358. SMITH, supra note 200, at 5. 
 359. See Cross, supra note 11, at 880 (“[R]ights enforcement requires 
resources. . . . The ability to litigate ‘depends on ample purses and effective 
mobilization of legal services, which vary greatly among different classes, 
groups, and sections of the country.’” (quoting J. WOODFORD HOWARD, COURTS OF 
APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 17 (1981))). 
 360. See Graber, supra note 200, at 787 (arguing judicial process can serve 
the interests of the poor in certain cases); Douglass Cassel, Does International 
Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121, 128–29 (2001) 
(suggesting the ability to litigate human rights under international treaties 
bolsters enforcement of government duties). 
 361. See GABRIEL BITRAN & EDUARDO VALENZUELA, WORLD BANK, WATER 
SERVICES IN CHILE: COMPARING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 3 (2003) 
(describing rising rates and moral questions following the privatization of 
Chilean water programs). 
 362. See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text (describing Cochabamba, 
Bolivia’s privatization of the city’s water supply in order to pay for 
infrastructure improvements). 
 363. See Glennon, supra note 40, at 1892–93 (discussing different models of 
privatization and water pricing). 
2256 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2013) 
into account social factors, including the ability of the poor to 
pay.364 In any event, “privatization” is a misnomer in almost all 
cases, given the extensive governmental involvement through 
regulatory oversight and in concession contracting, and typically 
as the public trustee of the water resources themselves.365  
However, this raises the question of whether a provision 
rights approach is faulty in the abstract, or whether the common 
formulation and implementation of such rights lead to the 
problems of enforceability and sustainability discussed in this 
Article. Arguably, the failure to effectively implement a provision 
right to water in South Africa, as illustrated in Mazibuko, is not 
evidence of a fundamentally incurable flaw of the provision right 
framework but, instead, of failure in South Africa to effectively 
frame and implement that right.366 In any event, concerns of 
enforceability are common with respect to a provision rights 
approach in any context, not just in water policy.367 Furthermore, 
concerns related to enforceability are arguably mooted by noting 
that countries are better off imposing a duty on the government 
to make progress with respect to provision of essential goods and 
services even if the duty is effectively unenforceable.368 
                                                                                                     
 364. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 37, at 18–19 (explaining the World 
Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure has coined the concept of “sustainable 
cost recovery,” which embraces the goal of full cost-recovery in the long-term 
while also supporting targeted “pro-poor” policies).  
 365. See Private Passions, supra note 67 (explaining factors that affect water 
privatization models, including government taxation, investment, and social 
considerations). The Dublin Statement, a United Nations document addressing 
water sustainability policy, provides that water has “economic value in all its 
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.” The Dublin 
Statement, supra note 142, at 4. As such, international law arguably does not 
view privatization as a per se violation of the human right to water. See 
McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 23 (recognizing water as a finite, vulnerable, and 
essential resource that must be preserved through better—but undefined—
government management and the development of human rights law). 
 366. See supra notes 346–51 and accompanying text (discussing Mazibuko 
and the challenges of allocating resources under a provision rights approach). 
 367. See Herman Schwartz, The Wisdom and Enforceability of Welfare 
Rights as Constitutional Rights, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 2–3 (2001) (discussing the 
inclusion of social and economic rights in constitutions despite concerns about 
enforceability). 
 368. See id. (explaining that rights may be enforced by the judiciary or 
legislature, but even if they are unenforced, there is no evidence that non-
enforcement negatively affects the enforcement of other rights); Richard A. 
Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—and 
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Nevertheless, it is the very effort to comply with this duty that 
raises the challenge most unique to a rights-based approach to 
water—sustainability. The challenge of sustainability, arising 
from concerns unique to water policy, such as the perceived low 
value of water, its cultural meaning, its nature as a public good 
and ecological commons, societal reluctance to pay full cost for 
water services, and the relatively high costs associated with 
water infrastructure369 make water a particularly poor candidate 
for a provision right. Until the challenge of sustainability is 
effectively addressed in the formulation and implementation of a 
provision right to water, the participation right in water remains 
the preferred rights-based framework in water policy.370  
A fifth limitation of a general participation rights approach 
to water policy is that a provision rights approach is arguably a 
more integrated, centralized approach, whereas the participation 
rights approach is iterative and piecemeal. Such an approach 
may address the most egregious cases of water policy injustice, 
but it fails to expand and maintain access to clean, sufficient, 
affordable, and sustainable water for all.371 However, governance 
by litigation, whether under a provision rights or participation 
rights regime, is by nature iterative and piecemeal.372 
Furthermore, there could be value in prioritizing those instances 
where egregious water policy failures are attributable not to a 
                                                                                                     
for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (examining whether the right to 
government protection is legally enforceable).  
 369. See ROUSE, supra note 71, at 151–59 (detailing the challenges inherent 
to building, regulating, and maintaining water-related infrastructure).  
 370. See Andreas Neef, Lost in Translation: The Participatory Imperative 
and Local Water Governance in North Thailand and Southwest Germany, in 1 
WATER ALTERNATIVES 89, 105 (2008) (noting the participation rights framework 
is the preferred model for ensuring water rights, despite the difficulties posed by 
its implementation). The formulation and implementation of a more robust, 
sustainable, and enforceable provision right to water is outside the scope of this 
Article. However, the approach taken by the government of Chile has been one 
of the most successful in achieving cost-recovery with effective pro-poor policies 
in water services. See BITRAN & VALENZUELA, supra note 361, at 2–4 (analyzing 
the development of Chile’s water services system). See generally ROUSE, supra 
note 71.  
 371. See Neef, supra note 370, at 105–06 (providing examples of the 
participation rights model’s failure to provide equitable water rights for all 
citizens from data in case studies in Germany and Thailand). 
 372. See Cross, supra note 11, at 880–84 (discussing the challenges of rights 
enforcement though litigation). 
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lack of state or resources but instead to a violation of 
participation rights, including a breach of the fiduciary duty owed 
by the state under the public trust doctrine. Such an iterative 
approach not only prioritizes the most egregious cases of water 
stress due to malfeasance but allows for nuanced and adaptive 
consideration of localized conditions in responding to these cases.  
The participation right in water based on the public trust 
doctrine shares some of the potential limitations of a general 
participation rights approach to water policy. But the 
participation right in water based on the public trust doctrine has 
two additional potential limitations. First, the public trust 
doctrine is not recognized in all jurisdictions.373 The public trust 
doctrine has its roots in Roman law, and continues to enjoy 
recognition throughout much of Europe, persisting into the 
common law in the United States.374 However, there are many 
nations that do not recognize the public trust doctrine, at least 
not in a form that would facilitate a participation right in water 
as described above.375 Furthermore, equating a breach of the 
fiduciary duty with the infringement of a participation right is a 
significant reconceptualization of the public trust doctrine. 
Nevertheless, the broad acceptance of the public trust doctrine in 
many nations makes the doctrine sufficiently well-established to 
support a participation rights claim for many communities 
suffering from water stress and in search of legal avenues for 
                                                                                                     
 373.  See Timothy Mulvaney, Instream Flows and the Public Trust, 22 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 315, 344 (2009) (noting that many nations do not recognize the 
public trust doctrine).  
 374. See THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN 
CIVIL LAW 63 (1999) (discussing the origins of the public trust doctrine); accord 
Takacs, supra note 335, at 713–15 (detailing the history of the public trust 
doctrine beginning with Emperor Justinian); Dowie, supra note 52 (outlining 
the public trust doctrine’s origins in sixth-century Rome). 
 375. See Mulvaney, supra note 373, at 344 (“The law in most nations 
recognizes some form of the public trust doctrine[.]”); accord Phillippe Cullet, 
Water Law in a Globalized World: The Need for a New Conceptual Framework, 
23 J. ENVTL. L. 233, 242 (2011) (describing the public trust doctrine as seeking 
to recognize water rights as requiring regulation and governance and noting the 
system has the potential to limit arbitrary state action); Stephen McCaffrey, 
International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water Problems, 31 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 139, 147 (1991) (suggesting a global public trust doctrine as 
one way to protect common resources). 
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redress or reform.376 And what is a participation right, if not the 
fiduciary duty owed by the state to honor and not unreasonably 
interfere with interests held by its citizens? 
Second, a participation right in water based on the public 
trust doctrine constitutes a misapplication of the public trust 
doctrine. The public trust doctrine is most commonly asserted by 
the state in an effort to exert control over natural resources, 
impose environmental protections, or avoid claims for 
compensation related to takings of natural resources.377 
Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine is meaningless as a “trust” 
if there is no corresponding fiduciary duty of the state in 
managing resources held in trust, and no such fiduciary duty can 
meaningfully exist without the possibility of beneficiaries of the 
public trust enforcing that duty in court.378 
Perhaps the most obvious objection to a participation rights 
approach to water policy, both in general and specifically an 
approach based on the public trust doctrine, is that a 
participation right does not actually require the delivery of 
sufficient clean water. So long as governments provide due 
process and avoid authorizing unreasonable or nonbeneficial uses 
of water, there is no recourse for those suffering from water 
stress against their government.379 A person may not be 
discriminated against, be deprived of property without due 
process, or have their freedom of religion circumscribed, but still 
                                                                                                     
 376. See Ved. P. Nanda & William K. Ris, The Public Trust Doctrine: A 
Viable Approach to International Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
291, 315 (1976) (citing Chile and Libya as examples of nations not recognizing 
the public trust doctrine). 
 377. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 464 (1892) (holding 
the State of Illinois holds fee simple in the lake bed of Lake Michigan and the 
City of Chicago has the exclusive right to develop Chicago’s harbor). 
 378. See Arnold, supra note 114, at 849 (describing the American legal 
system as struggling with multiple theories on water management, including 
the public trust doctrine, which requires the government and collective citizenry 
to be responsible stewards of water resources); Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to 
Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust 
Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 843 (2010) (referencing the Alaska Supreme Court 
as defining the public trust doctrine as the state holding “resources in trust for 
public use and owing a fiduciary duty to manage these resources for the common 
good”). 
 379. See Sax, supra note 51, at 471 (describing potential limited 
governmental responsibilities under a public trust doctrine). 
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be dying of thirst or cholera. Such a person is, in effect, reading 
Pushkin without boots on his feet. A participation right in water 
may maintain and improve control over water resources, but it 
fails to ensure provision. The next Subpart will address how a 
participation rights approach can do more than merely secure a 
degree of control, but instead can achieve equitable, sustainable, 
and affordable provision of sufficient clean water. 
C. A Participation Right in Water and Water Provision 
A participation right in water is more than a simple strategic 
decision of selecting the immediately binding and enforceable 
right. It is also more than the cautious approach of avoiding 
issues of sustainability while still making use of rights-based 
norms and rhetoric.380 A participation right in water would lead 
to equitable, sustainable, and affordable provision of sufficient 
clean water by fostering participatory governance in formulating 
and implementing water policy. A participation right in water 
gives those suffering most from water stress the necessary legal 
leverage to secure a place at the stakeholder table in water policy 
development. 
This leverage facilitates a broadly inclusive stakeholder 
group, with the least advantaged empowered by an enforceable 
participation right. This inclusivity in participatory governance 
facilitates the kind of public discourse and generation of binding 
norms associated with the constructivist approach discussed 
above.381 Individuals or communities suffering from water stress 
who may otherwise be marginalized in water policy development 
use the participation right in water to enforce a transparent and 
inclusive process.382 Such a process builds a “normative 
community” within which values of equity and sustainability 
develop organically, ultimately leading to equitable and 
                                                                                                     
 380. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (arguing that 
participation rights are citizen’s rights that serve as protection against 
government interference except in small, legally derived instances). 
 381. See supra note 343 and accompanying text (defining constructivism as 
“[s]upranational organizations teach[ing] national governments how to govern 
by means of developing and encouraging international discourse and norms”).  
 382. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 15–17 (describing examples of models for 
greater participation and the help these models bring to poorer communities). 
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sustainable water policy and provision of sufficient and affordable 
clean water.383 This process has been observed in terms of 
building normative communities valuing ecosystem services 
provided by wetlands, which ultimately evolve into regulatory 
protections for threatened ecosystems.384 A participation rights 
approach could be best suited for ensuring diverse- and 
representative-stakeholder participation because of the focus of 
participation rights on equal protection and nondiscrimination 
norms.385 A similar process could be applied to the valuation of 
drinking water resources and infrastructure, building toward 
greater acceptance of water pricing, conservation, and cost 
recovery measures, decreasing illegal connections, and increasing 
political support for capital expenditures to improve and 
maintain water infrastructure.386 The procedural remedies for 
violations of the participation right in water thus lead to changes 
in public discourse and values and, ultimately, to substantive 
improvements in policies addressing water stress. 
A provision rights approach is arguably a more integrated, 
centralized approach, whereas the participation rights approach 
is iterative and piecemeal. A participation rights approach may 
address the most egregious cases of water-policy injustice, such 
                                                                                                     
 383. See Kenneth Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Pathways to International 
Cooperation, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 56–57 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe 
Hirsch eds., 2004) (describing progressively binding norms forming 
incrementally through increasingly stringent treaty systems to which countries 
agree after growing accustomed to the previous treaty). 
 384. See Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and 
Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT’L. L. 26, 56–57 
(1997) (evaluating, empirically, how improved procedures and access to 
stakeholder processes increased public participation at the local level in 
wetlands management, ultimately leading to improved substantive outcomes in 
resource management). 
 385. See Zetland, supra note 32, at 15 (suggesting that a transparent process 
for distributing water rights “with significant participation by private owners 
would produce better outcomes than the current norm of favoring political and 
economic elites” as it incentivizes wider participation and reduces corrupt 
government influences). 
 386. See id. at 15–16 (arguing that mass participation in the water market 
would decrease externalities, limit value-decreasing fights among interested 
groups (therefore stabilizing valuations), and remove value calculation 
responsibilities from partisan political bodies). Citizens would allocate water 
through price policies based on collective societal values. Id. 
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as disconnection or rate increases on ethnic, religious, or political 
grounds, but fails to expand and maintain access to clean, 
sufficient, affordable, and sustainable water for all.387 Distinct 
communities facing different water challenges would bring claims 
of a participation right to water, each requiring redress 
individually without a holistic, coordinated approach typical of a 
centralized provision right. However, such an iterative approach 
allows for nuanced and adaptive consideration of localized 
conditions and encourages broad stakeholder participation in 
water policy development, thereby developing informal norms 
that ultimately translate into enforceable rights and duties.388  
Beyond facilitating participatory and transparent 
governance, a participation rights approach to water policy also 
facilitates policy experimentation. Experimentalism is a part of 
so-called “new governance” methods adapted from the industrial 
management context.389 Rather than the top-down hierarchical 
approach typical of government, and illustrated by the 
centralized character of a provision rights approach to water 
policy, new governance adopts an adaptive and collaborative 
model.390 New governance approaches favor process-oriented 
                                                                                                     
 387. See id. (noting potential failures of a system where citizens are the 
owners of water—as opposed to the government—including inevitably that those 
who want to consume more will simply be able to purchase it).  
 388. See id. (noting that broader inclusion through property rights leads to 
increased participation); Brunnee & Toope, supra note 384, at 31–33 (discussing 
how broader participation can lead to the establishment of legally enforceable 
rights). Brunnee and Toope, in writing about a constructivist approach to 
freshwater ecosystem preservation, refer to these normative communities as 
“contextual regimes,” in which informal norms evolve into legally binding 
norms. Id. at 33. 
 389. See Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for 
the Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 351, 393–94 (2008) (“Experimentalist approaches are part of a 
constellation of so-called ‘new governance’ methods originally advocated in 
industrial and managerial context, and since applied to fields including 
government regulation of social problems.” (citation omitted)); Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 92–93 
(1997) (advocating experiments in agency governance that facilitate 
collaboration between agencies and private interests as a means of field testing 
regulatory policies). 
 390. See Klein, supra note 389, at 394 (“Instead of a top-down, hierarchical 
rule-based system . . . the new governance school posits a more participatory 
and collaborative model of regulation in which multiple stakeholders, including, 
depending on the context, government, civil society, business and nonprofit 
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strategies, similar to the remedies associated with a participation 
right in water based on the public trust doctrine.391 
Encouraging policy experimentation is also part of the new 
governance approach, as is “adaptive management,” the resource 
management decision-making corollary of policy 
experimentation.392 Adaptive management is “a systematic 
process for continually improving management policies and 
practices by learning from the outcomes of implemented 
management strategies.”393 This experimental and adaptive 
approach requires multiple institutions or jurisdictions 
implementing different, parallel strategies to achieve the same 
policy end.394 These separate institutions or jurisdictions collect 
data and compare costs, benefits, and outcomes, including 
evaluating whether success or failure can be reproduced in other 
institutions or jurisdictions or if success or failure could be 
attributed to unique localized or institutional issues.395  
                                                                                                     
organizations, collaborate to achieve a common purpose.”). 
 391. See id. (“In order to encourage flexibility and innovation, ‘new 
governance’ approaches favor more process-oriented policy strategies like 
disclosure requirements, benchmarking and standard-setting, audited self-
regulation, and the threat of imposition of default regulatory regimes to be 
applied where there is a lack of good-faith effort at achieving desired goals.”). 
 392. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 430–31 
(2004) (describing adaptive management as employing advanced strategies for 
monitoring and governing resource use and involving multiple public and 
private entities); Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 439 (1998) (discussing experimental 
agency branches). 
 393. Rhett B. Larson, Innovations and International Commons: The Case of 
Desalination Under International Law, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 759, 800 (2012) 
(quoting Claudia Paul-Wostl, Transitions Towards Adaptive Management of 
Water Facing Climate and Global Change, 21 WATER RESOURCE MGMT. 49, 51 
(2007)); see also DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL 
GUIDE v (2009) (stating that adaptive management is “a decision process that 
promotes flexible decision making that can be adjusted in the face of 
uncertainties as outcomes from management actions and other events become 
better understood . . . . It is not a ‘trial by error’ process, but rather emphasizes 
learning while doing” (citations omitted)). 
 394. See Klein, supra note 389, at 395 (describing institutions implementing 
parallel policies to achieve similar ends, creating increased data and allowing 
citizens to assess the utility of government services). 
 395. See id. (describing an experimentalist program).  
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Courts operating under an experimentalist approach, 
including a participation right in water based on the public trust 
doctrine, do not come up with a one-size-fits-all, once-and-for-all 
solution, but instead enforce a participatory, deliberative process 
in each individual case.396 Where individual cases are resolved 
differently based on that process and data is gathered, analyzed, 
and compared to approaches in other cases, best practices for 
individual institutional and local conditions will develop and 
become evident.397 Where local water management institutions 
fail to engage in this participatory experimentalist approach, 
courts can impose best practices from other outcomes until the 
proper process is completed.398 In this sense, an experimentalist 
and constructivist approach is procedural because courts ask 
“what entities, jurisdictions, and agencies did to look for 
solutions, rather than whether the solutions were the right 
ones.”399 This relieves the court from having to make the sort of 
technical determinations for which the South African 
Constitutional Court considered courts so ill-suited in its decision 
in Mazibuko.400 
There is some evidence that an approach of court 
enforcement of procedures based on these theories of new 
governance and constructivism yield positive results in water 
                                                                                                     
 396. See id. at 396 (arguing that a court “in an experimentalist system . . . 
does not come up with once-and-for-all solutions to threats against individual 
rights” but, rather, assesses individual cases and ensure the state is engaging in 
a deliberative process). 
 397. See id. (“[W]here entities engage in the required consultative and 
deliberative process, generate enough data on the effectiveness of their chosen 
mechanisms to make rolling best practice standards possible, and adopt the best 
practices of other localities or justify deviations, courts will defer to these 
choices.”). 
 398. See id. (“Where local entities fail to engage in the experimentalist 
project, a court can impose a ‘penalty default’—its own benchmark or 
minimum—using whatever evidence is available to it in the litigation or, where 
possible, with reference to those generated from other localities’ experiments.”). 
 399. Id. at 396–97 (quoting Dorf & Sabel, supra note 392, at 286–87). But see 
John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History and 
Assessment, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 457–60 (2006) (noting the limitations 
of a decentralized participatory approach). 
 400. See Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg, 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 30 para. 
61 (S. Afr.) (“[I]t is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine 
precisely what the achievement of any particular social and economic right 
entails . . . .”). 
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policy. Commentators have noted the success of the European 
Union (EU) Water Framework Directive in establishing an 
enforceable right of stakeholders to participate in the 
development of water policy, and that such enforcement has 
improved access and sustainability.401 The success of a 
participatory, localized, and experimental process based on 
constructivist theories and new governance approaches is not 
unique to the EU.402 An empirical analysis of forty-seven case 
studies around the world involving a similar approach has 
demonstrated improvements in indicia of sustainable 
environmental stewardship.403  
A rights-based approach to water policy is not about an 
expansive interpretation of “rights” but is about participatory 
governance.404 Without the legal leverage of rights, marginalized 
individuals and communities have limited recourse and little 
voice in addressing the impacts of water stress, which are 
disproportionately felt by the disenfranchised or economically 
disadvantaged.405 An enforceable participation right in water 
empowers disadvantaged groups to influence water policy 
without requiring unsustainable water provision that fails to 
account for localized conditions.406 The growing global water crisis 
                                                                                                     
 401. See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the 
Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 580–82 (2007) 
(describing the Water Framework Directive as an example of new governance, 
which increases recognition of participation rights).  
 402. See Jens Newig & Oliver Fritsch, Environmental Governance: 
Participatory, Multi-Level—and Effective? 197–214 (Leibniz Information Centre 
for Economics, Paper No. 15/2008, 2009), available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44744 (analyzing case studies from forty-seven 
countries and finding the participation of citizens in natural resource and 
sustainability programs improved environmental outcomes). 
 403. Id. For an illustration of the challenges of implementing a 
participatory, localized approach to water management, see Neef, supra note 
370, at 89–110 (detailing a comparative case study of water governance in 
Thailand and Germany). 
 404. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 692 (“A participatory 
process may be the key to effective implementation of [water] rights”). 
 405. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (defining water stress). 
 406. See McCaffrey & Neville, supra note 219, at 693 (noting governments’ 
ability to increase their capacity to deliver on citizens’ water rights by 
developing collaborative relationships with community leaders and including 
communities in decision making so as to extend resources and overcome 
capacity barriers). 
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is not a crisis of nature or lack of available technology: there is 
enough water, and the capacity to produce enough clean water to 
meet existing and expected global populations.407 The water crisis 
is a “crisis of governance.”408 A participation right in water 
facilitates a broadly inclusive normative community by giving the 
least advantaged the legal leverage necessary to engage in the 
stakeholder process at the local level, thereby promoting an 
adaptive and nuanced water policy.  
V. Conclusion 
A rights-based framework has a potentially important role to 
play in advancing sustainable and equitable water policy. The 
dominant provision right framework raises serious concerns of 
sustainability and enforceability.409 The critical evaluation of the 
provision right approach in this Article assumes the typical 
framework that fails to appropriately account for full cost-
recovery and environmental concerns.410 Further research is 
needed on whether and how a provision right to water could 
potentially be framed to adequately incorporate concerns for full 
cost recovery, public health, infrastructure financing, and 
environmental sustainability.  
A participation rights framework avoids the issues of 
sustainability and enforceability associated with the provision 
right to water while still maintaining the advantage of a rights-
                                                                                                     
 407. See Deborah Zabarenko, River Basins Could Double Food Production, 
REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2011; 10:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
09/27/us-rivers-food-idUSTRE78Q0BZ20110927 (arguing that, while there is 
water scarcity in some places, the issue is not actually water scarcity, but the 
political will and ability to efficiently and fairly allocate water rights) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 408. See A. Mukherji, Is Incentive Use of Groundwater a Solution to the 
World’s Water Crisis?, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? 188 (P. Rogers, M 
Ramón Llamas & L. Martínez-Cortina eds., 2006) (describing the water crisis as 
“mainly a crisis of governance” (internal quotes omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 409. See supra notes 171–77 and accompanying text (discussing the 
enforceability of a provision right to water, specifically economic and political 
limitations and courts’ limited capacity to enforce provision rights and 
illustrating these limitations through a discussion of Mazibuko). 
 410. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text (discussing limitations 
of adjudicating provision rights, including courts’ inability to take 
environmental and factors into account due to the rigid legal standards applied).  
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based framework—that of prioritizing water policy, promoting 
equity in water provision, and holding governments accountable 
for mismanagement of water resources.411 By grounding the 
participation right in water in the public trust doctrine, the 
rights-based approach to water policy is inexorably tied to the 
most important and difficult consideration to integrate in a 
rights-based framework—sustainability.412 More research is 
needed into the costs and benefits of different participation rights 
approaches to water resource claims and which provide the best 
outcomes for disadvantaged people with the fewest costs to the 
formulation of an integrated national water policy. In particular, 
more research is required to understand how the public trust 
doctrine relates to participation rights claims and how different 
interpretations and applications of the public trust doctrine in 
different jurisdictions could impact the development of a 
participation right in water. 
The objectives of water policy—clean, sustainable, sufficient, 
and affordable water for all—can be facilitated by a participation 
right in water. Participatory governance encourages equitable 
water provision by empowering the least advantaged suffering 
disproportionately from water stress.413 As a right with a 
procedural remedy, the participation right in water achieves 
these objectives without sacrificing sustainability or 
enforceability. This is particularly true for a participation right in 
water based on the public trust doctrine because that doctrine 
imposes an enforceable fiduciary duty on the state to manage 
water in a sustainable manner. The participation right in water 
thus provides a potentially powerful tool for addressing the global 
water-stress crisis. 
  
                                                                                                     
 411. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (arguing that participation 
rights, rather than provision rights, involve government forbearance and do not 
raise economic and sustainability issues). 
 412. See supra notes 317–23 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 
participation rights doctrine is being integrated into international law via the 
public trust doctrine and arguing that this link has helped move environmental 
protection policies into the forefront of political debates in some countries). 
 413. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text (discussing Mazibuko, a 
primary example of the empowerment of economically disadvantaged 
populations challenging established water laws). 
